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Case No. 20140851-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.
PAUL DUBRAE WALDOCH,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for object rape, a first degree
felony, and two counts of forcible sexual abuse, second degree felonies.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0) (West
Supp. 2012).

INTRODUCTION
The victim agreed to give Defendant Paul Waldoch a ride home from
a party. Instead of directing her toward his home, he tried steer her up a
nearby canyon. When this misdirection failed, he expressed his desire for
her and began "vigorously kissing and sucking" on her neck as she drove.
The "shocked" victim pushed Waldoch away and told him to stop.
Undaunted, he put his hands down her shirt and pants, rubbing her breasts

and the outside of her vagina. The victim stopped her car and told Waldoch
to get out. He refused, put his finger in her vagina, rubbed "really hard,"
and forced her to masturbate him. He then got out of the car and ran home.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The victim testified that Waldoch put his finger "inside" her vagina
and rubbed her "really hard."

She previously told police and medical

personnel that Waldoch digitally penetrated her. And both prosecution and
defense experts testified that the victim's injuries were consistent with
digital penetration.
1. Was this evidence sufficient for the jury to find penetration?

Standard of Review. This Court reviews all evidence and reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict and reverses only if the
evidence is so "inconclusive or inherently improbable" that reasonable
minds must have a reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156
(Utah 1991) (citation omitted).
The jury foreman was married to one of the alternate jurors. Neither
the court nor counsel asked the jurors if their relationship would bias them.
The alternate juror spouse was dismissed after closing arguments and did
not participate in deliberations.
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2.A. Does the fact that a juror and an alternate juror are married to
each other constitute an exceptional circumstances relieving Defendant of
his preservation burden?

Standard of Review.

Exceptional circumstances excuse a lack of

preservation only when an issue was not raised below due to a rare
procedural anomaly. See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ,J23, 94 P.3d
186.
2. B. Did the trial court plainly err or did counsel render ineffective
assistance during jury selection by not asking venire members about bias
between jurors or by not striking one of the spouse jurors?

Standard of Review. Plain error requires obvious, prejudicial error.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). An ineffective assistance
claim raised for the first time on appeal is a question of law. State v. Ott,
2010 UT 1, if 16, 247 P.3d 344.
Rule 17(k), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires a court to
admonish jurors before each recess to not discuss the case and to not form
or express an opinion on the case until the case is submitted to the1n. The
court took nine recesses during trial; four of these included admonish1nents,
five did not. None of the pre-recess admonishments included an injunction
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against forming an opinion, but the opening jury instructions fully informed
the jury consistent with rule 17(k).
2.C. Did the trial court plainly err by not giving, or did counsel
render ineffective assistance by not insisting on, full admonishments before
each recess and follow-up after each recess?

Standard of Review. See issue 2.B.

~'

The prosecutor argued in closing that the victim was credible based
on her demeanor, consistency, and behavior. He acknowledged that the
victim had a motive to maintain her story- assuming it was a lie - in order
to avoid the bad feelings of being branded a liar. He further argued that
Defendant had motives to lie based on the marital and legal consequences
he faced. Defense counsel did not object to any of this argument or request
any curative instruction.
3.A. Did the trial court plainly err or was defense counsel ineffective
for not interrupting the prosecutor's closing argument on the ground that it
inappropriately vouched for the victim's credibility?
3.B. Did the trial court plainly err for not sua sponte giving, or was
counsel ineffective for not seeking, a curative instruction on this same
argument?

Standard of review. See issue 2B.

-4-

Defense counsel retained a highly-qualified

expert on

rape

examinations, consulted her during the State's expert's testimony, and
called her to elicit testimony favorable to the defense, including that: the
physical evidence was equally consistent with consent and non-consent; the
State's medical witnesses were biased in favor of the victim; and portions of
the physical exam were inconsistent with the victim's story.
4.

Did counsel render ineffective assistance by not

II

fully

appreciat[ing] or mak[ing] use of" his expert's experience and opinions on
consent or lack of consent?

Standard of review. See issue 2.B.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-402.2 (object rape);
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (conduct of trial). 1

Unless otherwise indicated, the State cites to current versions of
statutes and rules, as they have not materially changed for purposes of
appeal.
1
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of f acts. 2

Melissa Sorensen had just gotten off work and was getting gas at a
service station when she saw her friend Bill with Defendant Paul Waldoch.
R299:156. Bill asked Melissa if she had any plans that night; Melissa said
she did not. Id. Bill invited her to come over for drinks at his mother's
house. Id. Melissa agreed. Id. After a low-key evening of drinking and
visiting, Bill asked Melissa if she wanted him to wake up his mom to drive
her home. Id. at 158. Melissa said that she would just stay the night to sleep

C

off her drinking. Id.
The next morning, Bill asked Melissa if she could give Waldoch a ride

G

home; Melissa agreed. Id. at 160. They got in the car, and Melissa asked
Waldoch where he lived. Id. He told her to head "out of town toward a
11

nearby canyon. Id.
town?fl

Melissa asked, "Dod t you live on the other side of

Id. at 160-61. Waldoch asked her how she knew that. Id. at 161.

Melissa said that she heard someone at the party say that he lived near
Wendy's. Id.

Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are recited in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06
(Utah 1993).
2
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Q

As Melissa began driving toward town, Waldoch "[i]mmediately ...
grabbed [her] neck and started very vigorously kissing and sucking" on it.

Id. Melissa was "shocked"; she said, "Stop it. What are you doing?" and
"tried to push him away."

Id.

Undeterred, Waldoch told her that he
II

"wanted this since the first time [he] saw [her]." Id. at 174. He started
putting his hands in [her] shirt and down [her] pants," rubbing her breasts
and vagina under her clothing as she drove. Id. at 162-64. All this time,
Waldoch continued to misdirect her away from his home, saying that "he
lived in different areas of town." Id. at 164-65, 173.
Melissa pulled over multiple times, telling Waldoch to "Get out of the
car." Id. at 163-65. Waldoch repeatedly refused. Id. When Melissa pulled
II

over near a call center, things got worse": Waldoch "stuck his finger inside
of" her vagina and rubbed it "really hard." Id. at 164-66; State's Exh. _21 at 2.
Melissa again tried to dissuade him, telling him that it hurt, that she was
menstruating, and that he was married.

R299:166.

Waldoch, still

undeterred, grabbed Melissa's hand and put it on his penis, forcing her to
rub it "until he ejaculate[d] all over" her sweater. Id. He then "just got out
of the car and ran to his house." Id. at 167.
Melissa was "in shock" and disgusted." Id. She "went home and
II

went to bed for two days." Id. Her vagina felt "extremely bruised inside
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and out," and was just really red and swollen." Id. at 172. After concerned
friends checked in on her and encouraged her to report what happened,
Melissa went to the hospital. Id. at 170. There, she underwent a rape exam
that was "extremely humiliating," requiring her to submit to nude pictures
and to "re-live it again" by telling "a stranger what happened." Id. at 172.
The exam revealed bruising on Melissa's rib cage, under her left
breast, and on both thighs. R298:95-96; State's Exh. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9. She also had
vaginal abrasions. R298:100-02; State's Exh. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10. These injuries
were consistent with her story. R298:116. And her story itself remained
consistent from her written statement to police to her statements to 1nedical
providers, to her testimony at trial. Compare R298:72-74, 98-99; R299:161-66;
State's Exh. 20, 21. Further corroboration came via DNA testing, which
confirmed Waldoch's semen on her sweater. R299:128; State's Exh. 11, 12.

Defendant's story.

Waldoch admitted that he had ejaculated on

Melissa's sweater, but claimed that it had been consensual. R299:258. He
denied misdirecting Melissa, rubbing her breasts and vagina, or penetrating
her vagina. Id. at 260-61, 264-65. He claimed that she had come onto him
during the ride and that the only contact between them was her kissing and
masturbating him. Id. at 258,260.
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B.

Summary of proceedings. 3
The State charged Waldoch with one count of object rape, a first

degree felony, and two counts of forcible sexual abuse, second degree
felonies. Rl 19-21. The jury convicted him as charged. R232. The trial court
sentenced him to a prison term of five years to life on the object rape count,
and two suspended terms of one to fifteen years on the forcible sexual abuse
counts. R288-89. Waldoch timely appealed. R292-93. The Utah Supreme
Court transferred the case to this Court. Order of Sep. 24, 2014.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I: Penetration sufficiency.

Waldoch first argues that the

evidence of penetration was so contradictory as to preclude the jury from
considering it. But in doing so, he largely fails to account for the victim
describing two different portions of Waldoch's abuse-an earlier one in
which he rubbed the outside of her vagina and a later one in which he
digitally penetrated and rubbed the inside of her vagina.

The victim's

testimony alone was sufficient to prove penetration.

It was also

corroborated by the victim's prior statements and the physical evidence. To
the extent that other evidence may have cast doubt on the victim's

The pleadings file is numbered in reverse order. The State cites it in
regular order.
3
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assertions, it created merely a factual dispute that the jury was able to-and
did- resolve against Waldoch.
Issue II: Plain error/ineffective assistance regarding spouse jurors.

Waldoch's second set of arguments relate to the jury foreman being married
to one of the alternate jurors. He argues that (1) having spouse jurors is an
exceptional circumstance excusing his preservation failures and relieving
him of his prejudice burden; (2) the court or counsel should have either (a)
asked the jury panel if their relationships with each other would prejudice
them, or (b) stricken one of the spouse jurors; and (3) the court or counsel
should have insisted on admonishing the jurors before each recess not to

foni1 opinions or discuss the case with each other prior to deliberations, and
followed up to ensure that each admonishment was followed.
All of these arguments are unpreserved and inadequately briefed. He
has thus failed to carry his burden of persuasion on appeal.

But his

arguments also fail under plain error and ineffective assistance analysis.
As a preliminary matter, the exceptional circumstances doctrine
applies to rare procedural anomalies, not the facts here.
Regarding jury selection, Waldoch cannot show plain error because
he invited any error by passing the jury for cause. He alternatively argues
that his trial counsel was ineffective for not striking one of the spouse jurors
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or at least inquiring into juror biases stemming from relationships with
other jurors. But Waldoch cannot show prejudice because he has not shown
that a biased juror sat.
Regarding juror admonitions, there is no presumption of prejudice
from a failure to admonish except perhaps where-unlike here-a trial
court fails to admonish the jury at all.

And Waldoch has not shown

prejudice because he has not demonstrated that the jurors violated the
admonitions they were given.
Issue III: Plain error/Ineffective assistance regarding alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. Waldoch argues that the trial court plainly erred

and/ or that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's
closing argument on the basis that the prosecutor vouched for the victim's
credibility and appealed to the juror's emotions.

These arguments are

unpreserved and inadequately briefed. At any rate, the prosecutor did not
vouch or appeal to the jury's passions; rather, he made permissible
arguments to infer the victim's truthfulness from the evidence.
Because the prosecutor's arguments were valid, Waldoch has not
shown any error, let alone plain error. And he has not shown ineffective
assistance because any objection to these valid arguments would have been
futile.
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Issue IV: Ineffective assistance regarding use of expert testimony.
Waldoch finally argues that his counsel was ineffective for not asking more
questions of his expert medical witness. Because he does not say what those
questions- or their answers -would be, this claim is inadequately briefed.
In any event, Waldoch cannot show ineffective assistance where counsel
hired a highly-qualified expert, consulted her during trial, and called her to
give testimony helpful to Waldoch' s case.

ARGUMENT
I.
The victim's testimony and corroborating physical evidence
sufficed to show penetration. 4

To prove object rape, the State needed to show that Waldoch (1)
"without the victim's consent"; (2) "caused the penetration, however slight,

Waldoch appears to concede that none of his appellate arguments
are preserved. Br.Aplt. 39. Though that concession is well-taken on his
other arguments, it appears precipitous here. Counsel moved after verdict
to reduce the object rape from a first degree felony to a second degree felony
based on an alleged lack of evidence of penetration. R299:310. The trial
court denied the motion. Id.
4

In substance, counsel's motion was to arrest judg1nent under rule 23,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure-the standard for which is identical to
the directed verdict standard. See State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, if 14, 210 P.3d
288.
Counsel thus made a timely, specific motion preserving the
penetration sufficiency issue. Further, whether or not the objection was
timely, the trial court ruled on its merits, which would have preserved the
issue under State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991), and its progeny.
Thus, the State treats this claim as preserved.
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of the genital ... opening" of a person over 14; (3) "by any foreign object, ...
including part of the human body other than the mouth or genitals"; (4)
"with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to the victim or
with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-402.2. Waldoch disputes the sufficiency of evidence only
on the penetration element, asserting that the victim's testimony of
penetration is insufficient because it was contradicted by both her own
statements and the physical evidence. Br.Aplt. 25-31. But both the physical
evidence and the victim's consistent accounts support a finding of
penetration.
For purposes of rape and object rape, penetration is defined in case
law as "entry between the outer folds of the labia." State v. Simmons, 759
P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1988) (citing 65 Am.Jur.2d Rape§ 3 (1972)). Though
Waldoch asserts that it is "questionable whether [this] standard applies to
penetration under" the object rape statute, Br.Aplt. 28, the Simmons court
was clear that this definition applied to all forms of rape, including object
rape. See Simmons, 759 P.2d at 1154.
When reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency, this Court reviews all
evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict
and reverses only if the evidence is so "inconclusive or inherently

-13-

improbable" that reasonable minds must have had a reasonable doubt.

State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted).
Contradictory evidence alone "is not sufficient to disturb a jury verdict";
rather, to justify reversal, the evidence must be physically impossible or
obviously false. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,I183, 299 P.3d 892 (citation
omitted).
This standard is "highly deferential." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, 168,
345 P.3d 1195 (citations and quotations omitted). And rightly so. The jury's
role is to determine guilt, and so long as "there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of
the crime can reasonably be made," appellate review "stops." State v. Mead,
2001 UT 58, if 67, 27 P.3d 1115 (citation omitted).
There was ample evidence of penetration here. The victim testified at
trial that Waldoch repeatedly put his finger or fingers inside her vagina. See
R299:165-166, 179. This was consistent with her prior accounts. She told the
physician's assistant at the hospital that Waldoch penetrated her vagina
with his fingers.

R298:74, 79, 83-85.

She told the sexual assault nurse

examiner that Waldoch penetrated her vagina with his hand. R298:98-99.
And she told police that Waldoch penetrated her with his fingers, though he
could not get very far because she was wearing a tampon. State's Exh. 21 at
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2.

Her testimony was also consistent with the physical evidence - the

victim had abrasions on her inner labia and vagina consistent with digital
penetration. R298:100-03, 116. All this was plainly sufficient to support a
finding of penetration-that is, that Waldoch's finger at least entered
"between the outer folds of the labia." Simmons, 759 P.2d at 1154.
In arguing to the contrary, Waldoch points to various pieces of
evidence, none of them availing. First, he points to DNA testing excluding
him as a contributor to the DNA from a swab of the victim's neck. Br.Aplt.
25; see also R298:126; State's Exh. 13 at 1-3.

This, he asserts, calls "into

question the victim's testimony" that Waldoch "grabbed her and started
kissing and sucking on her neck." Br.Aplt. 25. But calling testimony into
question does not render it physically impossible or inherently improbable.

State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991) ("The mere existence of
conflicting evidence ... does not warrant reversal."). And given that the
victim was at home in bed for two days, it is not surprising that Waldoch's
DNA might not have stayed on her neck, particularly where the State's
DNA expert opined that "two or three days" seemed like a "pretty long"
time for another's DNA to remain on s01neone's skin.

R298:138.

The

absence of Waldoch's DNA on the victim's neck was not enough to justify
the trial court in taking the case from the jury.
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Waldoch next argues that the victim's testimony of penetration was
undermined by (1) the victim saying that he rubbed the outside of her
vagina; (2) a medical record allegedly containing no reference to
penetration; and (3) his expert's testimony that the victim's injuries were
more consistent with external rubbing than internal rubbing. Br.Aplt. 25-26
(citing State's Exh. 20), 29-30. Not so. First, the victim was clear at trial that
there were two instances of vaginal rubbing- the first on the outside, and
the second on the inside. R299:163-65; see also State's Exh. 21. And both the
physician's assistant and the sexual assault nurse were clear that the victim
did report that Waldoch digitally penetrated her, regardless of the content of
the written reports. See R298:74, 79, 83-85, 98-99.
Second, the very medical record he cites to undermines his argument.
Waldoch cites State's Exhibit 20 to support his assertion that it was
"unlikely that the qualified sexual assault nurse examiner would have
missed writing down the detail of penetration in the patient's description"
of the assault.

Br.Aplt. 26.

Though the victim's description does not

specifically address penetration, a separate question on the form states,
"Was there penetration?" State's Exh. 20. The nurse examiner marked
"yes" for this and wrote a note stating, "by hand to vagina." Id.
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Third, the defense expert's testimony that the victim's vaginal
abrasions were more consistent with outside rubbing than inside rubbing
did not mean that the jury had to speculate to find penetration. The victim
testified that Waldoch digitally penetrated her, and she reported digital
penetration to medical and police personnel. R299:165. The sexual assault
also nurse opined that her injuries were consistent with digital penetration.
R298:116.
Neither did the defense expert's testimony render the victim's
account incredible- it merely rendered credibility a jury question. Though
the defense expert testified that the victim's injuries were not in the
expected places, she did opine on cross-examination that the injuries were
equally consistent with both the victim's story and Waldoch's story.
R229:226-29, 232-33.

The State's expert opined that the victim's injuries

were consistent with the victim's account. R298:116. Though the State's
expert was not as experienced as the defense expert, Waldoch cites no
case-and the State is aware of none-that a jury must believe the expert
with greater experience. See Br.Aplt. 30. A mere difference of opinion or
experience between experts cannot justify taking the case from the jury. Cf

Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 200 (" [C]ourts are not bound to accept the testimony
of an expert and [are] free to judge the expert testimony as to its credibility
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and its persuasive influence in light of all the other evidence in the case.")
(citation and quotation omitted). Indeed, a "jury is not required to believe
an expert witness even when that expert's opinion is unchallenged by the
opinion of an opposing expert." Lyon v. Bryan, 2011 UT App 256, if10, 262
P.3d 1199.
In arguing this point, Waldoch also cites State v. Pullman, 2013 UT
App 168,306 P.3d 827, and State v. Simmons, 759 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1988). But
both cases are inapposite.

In Pullman, the teenage victim testified that

Pullman "tried to take [her] panties off and stick his dick into [her] butt,"
but that she pushed him away before he could do so. 2013 UT App 168,
if13. The victim also testified that "[i]t hurt" "there." Id. This Court held
that this testimony was not sufficient to prove that Pullman touched the
victim's anus- as opposed to her buttocks. Id. at if 16.
In Simmons, the victim testified that Simmons "put the tip of his penis
'on' her labia." 759 P.2d at 1154. The Utah Supreme Court held that this
was not sufficient to prove penetration-that is, entry beyond the "outer
folds of the victim's labia." Id.
In both Pullman and Simmons, the victims' testin1ony specifically
established lack of penetration.

Here, the victim repeatedly stated that

Waldoch put his finger or fingers "in" her vagina. In the context of female
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genitalia, "in" can mean nothing less than penetration as defined in

Simmons. See State v. Peterson, 2015 UT App 129,

,rs, 787 Utah Adv. Rep. 39

(holding female child victim's testimony that defendant put his finger "in"
her "front private" sufficient to prove penetration as defined in Simmons).
Further, in her written statement to police, the victim was even more
descriptive, stating that Waldoch "did penetrate [her] with his fingers but
couldn't [get] very far be[cause] of [her] tampon." State's Exh. 21 at 2
(emphasis in original).
In sum, the evidence was plainly sufficient to prove penetration, and
thus the trial court did not err in denying Waldoch' s motion for arrest of
judgment after the jury convicted of object rape.
II.

Defendant has not proven plain error or ineffective assistance
on any of his jury-related claims. 5

Waldoch next argues that the trial court plainly erred or that counsel
was ineffective for letting spouses sit as jurors and by not fully admonishing
the jury before each recess not to discuss the case or form opinions until the
case was submitted to them. Br.Aplt. 32-37, 42; see also Utah R. Crim. P.
17(k).

5 This

point responds to portions of Waldoch's points Band D.
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A. Jury selection and admonishments.

The jury venire included two married couples: James and Susan
Rasmussen and Dennis and Pat Crofts. See R298:4, 6, 19-20, 23-24, 26-27.
During jury selection, the potential jurors were questioned about their
citizenship; age; ability to understand English; criminal history; physical or
mental disabilities; family; employment; address; education; hobbies;
relationships with the parties, witnesses, counsel, the court, and law
enforcement; opinions on punishment; ability to judge fairly

and

impartially; undue hardship they might have; opinions on alcohol; and
willingness to follow instructions. Id. at 7-45.
The trial court then asked both counsel if there were "any questions
that" they "would like to ask to the jury as a whole or to any individual
juror."

R298:45.

The State declined.

Id.

The trial court asked defense

counsel if there were "any questions that [he] would like to address." Id. at
46. Defense counsel replied, "No, your honor." Id. Counsel then exercised
their peremptory challenges. Id. at 46-47. Of the four spouses in the venire,
three remained for h·ial: Pat Crofts 6 and James Rasmussen as jurors, and
Susan Rasmussen as an alternate.

In the jury list read by the court, Mrs. Crofts name appears as "Matt
Crofts." R298:47. Because there was no Matt Crofts in the venire, it appears
that the transcriber mistook "Pat" for "Matt."
6
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The court took nine recesses and admonished the jurors five times
over the course of a two-day trial. The admonishments had two aspects: (1)
not to discuss the case and (2) not to form an opinion about the case.
Recesses
Dayl
1. Ten-minute bathroom break
during jury selection. R298:45.

Admonishments
Not form opinion
Not discuss case
Potential jurors told None.
"not to talk about
the
case
with
anyone while [they
were] on break."
R298:45.
2. Lunch break, no evidence yet Jurors told not to None.
taken. R298:49-50.
talk about the case
with other jurors or
anyone else until
they had "retired to
deliberate," and that
this same injunction
would apply to "any
other recesses that
we take." R298:49.

Opening
jury
instructions
told
jury that during
recesses to "not talk
about this case with
anyone; not family,
friends, or even each
other," and not to
learn about the case
from media, and
that these restraints
were "necessary for
a fair trial." (R31011)
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Opening
jury
instructions
told
Jury to "keep an
open mind," to not
"form an opinion
about the ultimate
issues in this case
until [they] had
listened to all the
evidence and the
lawyer's summaries, along with the
instructions on the
law,"
and
to

3. Ten-minute recess because a None.
juror stood up. (R298:104)
4. Five-minute recess for defense None.
counsel to confer with expert.
(R298:108)
5. End of first day. (R298:147)
Jurors admonished
"not to talk about
the
case
with
anyone and not try
and learn about the
case outside the
courtroom."
(R298:147)
Day 2
Not discuss case
6. Fifteen-minute recess at close None.
of State's case for defense to
confer with expert. (R299:20607)
7. One-minute recess at defense None.
request. (R299:231).
8. Lunch break. (R299:242-43)
Jurors admonished
"not to talk about
the
case
with
anyone, and not try
and learn about it
outside
the
courtroom."
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"[k]eep an open
mind until then."
(R311)
Also told jurors to
"consider
each
other's opinion,"
to "reach Itheir]
own
decision,"
and to not "make a
decision just to
agree with everyone else." (R303)
None.
None.

None.

Not form opinion
None.

None.
None.

L

(R299:242-43)
9. Close of evidence, one hour None.
and fifteen minute break before
jury instructions (R299:269)

None.

Waldoch did not object to any of the admonishments-or lack thereof-nor
did he request that the court ask the jurors after recesses if they had
followed the admonishments. Susan Rasmussen was excused from the jury
after closing arguments and did not participate in deliberations. R299:301,
306.
B.

These claims are unpreserved and inadequately briefed.

As Waldoch appears to acknowledge, his jury selection and
admonishment claims are unpreserved. Br.Aplt. 39. Waldoch attempts to
overcome his preservation failures by claiming (1) plain error; (2) ineffective
assistance; and (3) exceptional circumstances. Id. at 40-41. But he does not
adequately brief any of them.
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address

arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,
304 (Utah 1998). The rules of appellate procedure require the argument
section of a brief to contain "the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
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and parts of the record relied on."

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis

added). An appellant may not just baldly cite authority, but must develop
that authority and provided "reasoned analysis based on that authority."

Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. And for each unpreserved issue, an appellant must
brief not only the facts and law governing the underlying claim, but explain
why it merits consideration due to exceptional circumstances, or merits
relief when viewed "through the lens" of plain error or ineffective
assistance. State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, if 21, 167 P.3d 1046. " [A]ppellants
who fail to follow rule 24' s substantive requirements will likely fail to
persuade the court of the validity of their position." State v. Roberts, 2015
UT 24, if 18,779 Utah Adv. Rep. 139.
Defendant's analysis of his jury claims fails to meet the requirements
of rule 24, and thus fails to meet his burden of persuasion. His discussion of
plain error, ineffective assistance, and exceptional circumstances spans
about four pages of his forty-four page brief, and is largely conclusory. This
does not meet the requirement that he brief each unpreserved issue
"through the lens" of these doctrines. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ii 21; see also

State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ,Il8, 789 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (holding
exceptional circumstances argument inadequately briefed because it lacked
authority and "reasoned analysis based on" it). In any event, even if this
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Court were to overlook his briefing failures, these arguments independently
fail.
C.

Defendant has not shown that spouse jurors constihtte an
exceptional circumstance excusing his preservation failures.
Waldoch appears to argue that having spouses on the jury qualifies as

an exceptional circumstance excusing his failure to object to any incomplete
or missing jury admonitions.

Br.Aplt. 40 (calling spouse jurors a "rare

procedural anomaly"). As a threshold matter, Waldoch has not even shown
that spouses sat on the jury together, given that Mrs. Rasmussen was
excused as an alternate before jury deliberations. Cf State v. Miller, 674 P.2d
130, 131 (Utah 1983) (holding that where alternate juror dismissed before
deliberations, the alternate "had no bearing on the jury's verdict").

But

even assuming that an alternate juror qualifies as a juror for purposes of this
argument, Waldoch misapprehends the exceptional circumstances doctrine.
The exceptional circumstances doctrine is not an independent basis

for relief, but a basis on which to consider the merits of a claim where some
"rare procedural anomal[y]" outside the appellant's control rendered
preservation impossible. See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ~23, 94
P.3d 186 (quoting Dwrn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3). few circmTLStances fit this
bill.

See, e.g., State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ,I26, 253 P.3d 1082 (rejecting

prison sentence as exceptional circumstance); Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29,
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,I24 (rejecting amendment to information as exceptional circumstance); State

v. Carter, 2015 UT App 109, ifll n.6, 785 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (rejecting change
in trial judge as exceptional circumstance); State v. Finlayson, 2014 UT App

282, if 55, _ Utah Adv. Rep._ (rejecting self-representation as exceptional
circumstance); State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996) (rejecting
failure to object to prosecutor remarks as exceptional circumstance). Those
that do include where "a change in law or the settled interpretation of law
color[s] the failure to have raised an issue at trial" -such as an amendment
to a governing statute during the appeal process, In re T.M., 2003 UT App
191, if 16, 73 P.3d 959 (citation omitted)- or where a trial judge effectively
usurps the function of counsel. State v. Beck, 2006 UT App 177, ,IlO, 136 P.3d

.

-

1288.
Waldoch cites no authority for the proposition that having spouse
jurors-particularly in rural jurisdictions-is at all "rare," let alone one that
presumptively results in injustice. Indeed, the jury venire here had two
married couples: the Rasmussens and the Crofts. See R298:19-20, 23-24, 2627. And the great weight of case law from other jurisdictions shows that
having spouses on juries does not constitute error. See, e.g., Childs v. State,
357 S.E.2d 48, 56-57 (Ga. 1987); State v. Richie, 960 P.2d 1227, 1244 (Haw.
1998); Harris v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 40, 49-50 (Ky. 2010); Savoie v.
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McCall's Boat Rentals, 491 So.2d 94, 102 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Miracle,
No. CA 85-11-091, 1986 WL 13268, *2 (Ohio Ct. App., Nov. 24 1986) Russell

v. State, 560 P.2d 1003, 1003 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (per curiam); State v.
Wilkins, 56 A.2d 473, 473-74 (Va. 1948); Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 406
S.E.2d 700, 709 (W.Va. 1991).
Because he has not shown an exceptional circumstance, Waldoch can
only get relief by showing (1) that the trial court plainly erred in (a)
conducting voir dire or (b) in its admonishments; or (2) that counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by (a) not insisting on a more extensive voir
dire or exercising a peremptory challenge to excuse one of the spouse jurors,
or (b) not insisting on full admonishments before each recess.

He has

shown none of these, because he has not proven prejudice.
D. Defendant bears the burden to prove prejudice on these
unpreserved claims.

Waldoch argues that the incomplete or missing admonishments
relieve him of his prejudice burden. Br.Aplt. 40. Waldoch is mistaken.
Where a claim is unpreserved- as Waldoch concedes that this is - the
burden is always on the appellant to show prejudice, even if he alleges
srructural error. See Nlaestas, 2012 UT 46, if ii 51, 158 (requiring defendant to
show prejudice on unpreserved failure to admonish claim and prosecutorial
misconduct claim); see also Kimmel man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 n. 7
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(1986) (explaining that "when an attorney chooses to default a Fourth
Amendment claim, he also loses the opportunity to obtain direct review"
under harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, and must instead
bear the burden of showing Strickland prejudice); State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d
153, 157 (Utah 1989) (applying Strickland prejudice to unpreserved alleged
public trial violation); State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, iJ17 n.1, 153 P.3d
804 (" Kimmelman suggests that unpreserved constitutional claims brought
collaterally under an ineffective assistance of counsel argument must satisfy
the Strickland actual prejudice standard" rather than Chapman's presumed
prejudice standard); State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, iJ11, 132 P.3d 703
("Defendant has the burden of demonstrating prejudice despite the fact that
he has alleged structural error.") (citing cases); cf State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,

if 18, 122 P.3d 543 (discussing federal rule that "a defendant claiming
constitutional error who did not object at trial may only argue plain error or
ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal and thus must prove prejudice,
@

even if the constitutional error claimed on appeal is structural in nature").
Waldoch relies on Maestas for the proposition that this Court 1nay
presume prejudice. Br.Aplt. 40. In Maestas, the court addressed a failure to
admonish claim in a two-week trial during which the trial court properly
admonished the jury seventeen times and failed to properly admonish them
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nine times. 2012 UT 46, 153. Maestas asked the court to presume harm
whenever a trial court misses an admonishment. Id. at 152. The supreme
court declined to adopt that rule, and found no harm from the failures to
admonish where there was no evidence that the jurors did not follow the
admonitions that the court did give. Id. at ~54.
The Maestas court noted in dicta that it did not "foreclose the
possibility that a presumption of harm may be warranted based upon the
particular circumstances of a case." Id. at ~53. To support this possibility,
the court cited United States v. Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 668 (10th Cir. 1984).

Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 53 n.36. Hart-which also found no prejudice from a
failure to admonish- distinguished Hart's circumstances from those in

United States v. Williams, 635 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1980). Hart, 729 F.2d at 668.
In Williams, the Eighth Circuit presumed prejudice where the trial court did
not admonish the jury at any time. 635 F.2d at 746.
Unlike in Williams, the trial court here gave one full- and several
partial- admonish1nents.

See Section II.A.

Moreover, Williams is an

outlier-the vast majority of cases involving a failure to admonish require a
showing of prejudice. See, e.g., Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 53 (no prejudice from
nine failures to admonish); United States v. Richardson, 817 F.2d 886, 889-90
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (no prejudice from two failures to admonish); United States
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v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595, 602 (2d Cir. 1963) (no prejudice from failure to
admonish); United States v. Nelson, 102 F.3d 1344, 1347-48 (4th Cir. 1996) (no
prejudice from total lack of admonishments); Rotolo v. United States, 404 F.2d
316,317 (5th Cir. 1968) (no prejudice from failure to admonish prior to lunch
recess); United States v. Weatherd, 699 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1983) (no
prejudice from single failure to admonish); Hart, 729 F.2d at 668 (no
prejudice from two failures to admonish); People v. Campbell, 63 Cal.App.3d
599, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (no prejudice from three failures to admonish);

People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 280-81 (Ill. 1990) (no prejudice from failure to
admonish before weekend recess); State v. Ralls, 515 P.2d 1205, 1209-10 (Kan.
1973) (no prejudice from failure to admonish); People v. Curtis, case no.
318699, 2015 WL 630396, *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2015) (no prejudice
from failures to admonish); State v. Deck, 136 S.W.3d 481, 486-87 (Mo. 2004)
(no prejudice from multiple failures to admonish); Blake v. State, 121 P.3d
567, 579 (Nev. 2005) (no prejudice from six failures to admonish); State v.

Thibodeaux, 459 S.E.2d 501, 507 (N.C. 1995) (no prejudice from failure to
admonish); cf State v. Hines, 307 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1957) (presuming
regularity of proceedings where record did not show admonishment prior
to dinner break). But see Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 612 (D.C. Cir.
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1957) (holding prejudice from failure to admonish where no admonishment
given prior to week-long recess).
Waldoch thus bears the burden of showing prejudice.
The prejudice standard in most ineffective assistance and plain error
claims is that in Strickland: a reasonable likelihood of a different result
absent the error.

See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989),

overruled on other grounds by State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah
1992). But in matters of jury selection and jury admonition, the prejudice
standards are different.
For a jury selection claim, Waldoch n1ust show that an actually biased
juror sat. State v. King, 2008 UT 54, if if 15-36, 190 P.3d 1283; see also State v.

Sessions, 2014 UT 44, if 31, 342 P.3d 738 (showing of "' actual juror bias"'
required to prove ineffective assistance for lacking neutral ground for
peremptory challenge); State v. An-iaga, 2012 UT App 295, ifl3, 288 P.3d 588
(counsel's deficient performance during jury selection prejudicial only if
biased juror sat). Showing "actual bias," of course, requires more than
merely showing potential or even presumptive bias. See King, 2008 UT 54,
~,Il8, 30-39 (explaining that requiring showing of mere potential bias would

be "illogical" and "lead to perverse results").

For example, though two

jurors in King had "made disclosures that suggested potential bias," King
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could not show prejudice without showing that his counsel's failure to
remove the jurors "allowed the seating of an actually biased juror." Id. at
,I,I19, 47 (emphasis added).

For a failure to admonish claim, Waldoch must show that the jurors
actually violated the admonitions they received. See, e.g., Maestas, 2012 UT
46, ,I54 (holding failures to admonish harmless where "there is nothing in
the record to indicate that the failures to admonish played any role in the
juror's conduct"); see also Bean, 560 N.E. 2d at 280 (" [W]ithout any evidence
that the jurors acted improperly we cannot find that the risk" of discussing
the case or hearing news reports "resulted in an unfair death penalty
hearing or a prejudiced jury"); Ralls, 515 P.2d at 1210 (requiring proof of
"prejudicial misconduct on the part of jurors" from lack of admonition);

Thibodeaux, 459 S.E.2d at 507 (holding no prejudice where defendant did
"not content, and did not show, that jurors engaged in any improper
conduct or conversation" that "tainted in any way" their deliberations).
Waldoch has not met these burdens on any of his claims.
E.

Defendant has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance
during jury selec~ion because Defendant passed the jurors for
cause, no law required inquiry about bias between jurors,
and he has not shown that a biased juror sat.

Waldoch first faults the trial court for not sua sponte striking one of
the spouse jurors during voir dire, or at least asking the jurors whether their
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relationships with other jurors biased them. Br.Aplt. 32-33. As explained
above, these arguments are inadequately briefed and should be rejected for
Defendant's failure to meet his burden of persuasion. But they also fail on
the merits.

No plain error.

Waldoch argues that the trial court should have

inquired during voir dire into "the relationship of jurors with each other or
the impact upon their ability to render an independent decision," or
alternatively "should have eliminated [Mrs. Rasmussen] and avoided the
potential risk" that she and her husband would discuss the case or have
their judgment impaired based on their spouse's opinions. Br.Aplt. 33, 40.
Because these claims are unpreserved, Waldoch must show plain
error. But plain error review is unavailable to a party who invites error.

State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, if15, 128 P.3d 1171. Waldoch invited any error
in jury selection by passing the jurors for cause. R298:46-47. This Court
should affirm on this basis alone.
But in any event, Waldoch has not shown plain error. Plain error
requires obvious, prejudicial error.

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09

(Utah 1993). Error is only obvious if there is controlling law on the subject.
See, e.g., State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, ,I25, 61 P.3d 1000 (holding error not
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obvious "where the alleged basis for that error is an ambiguous appellate
decision").
There is no statute or decision in Utah requiring courts to inquire into
potential bias between jurors. And the general rule nationwide appears to
be that bias goes to a juror's relationships with the parties, counsel, or the
judge-not each other. See Challenges for Cause in Jury Selection Process, §5 58
Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395 (Westlaw 2015) (discussing sources of bias,
but not mentioning juror relationships with each other); Wayne R. LaFave,
Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, and Orris S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure, §22.3(c)
(3d ed. 2007) (discussing potential sources of bias, not mentioning juror
relationships with each other). "With no controlling appellate decision on
the issue in Utah and no settled rule across the country, any alleged error in
this case could not have been obvious to the h·ial court." State v. Zaelit, 2010
UT App 208U, *3 n.6.
Likewise, no law in Utah forbids spouses from serving on juries
together and-as shown above-the great weight of authority from other
jurisdictions permits spouses to serve together as jurors.
Neither has Waldoch shown prejudice, because he has not shown
that a biased juror sat. King, 2008 UT 54,
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if if 15-36.

No ineffective assistance.

Waldoch alternatively claims that counsel

was ineffective during jury selection for not asking the jurors whether their
relationships with each other would bias them or by not striking one of the
spouse jurors. 7 Br.Aplt. 33, 40. Ineffective assistance requires that counsel
(1) perform deficiently in a way that (2) prejudices the defendant. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The prejudice standard for plain
error and ineffective assistance is the same. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,
iJ31 n.14, 12 P.3d 92.
Waldoch has not shown deficient performance because counsel could
have reasonably decided that there was no need to ask the jurors about any
bias stemming from their relationships with each other, particularly where
no established law required it. See State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 720 (Utah App.
1997) (noting that "if an error was not obvious to the trial court, it most
likely was not obvious to trial counsel"). Moreover, counsel could have
reasonably decided that he had enough information dispelling bias from the
Waldoch appears to concede that he cannot challenge his counsel's
decision to not use a peremptory challenge on one of the spouse jurors
based on the "cure or waive" rule in State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, iJ36 n.3, 24
P.3d 948. The State notes, however, that the supreme court repudiated this
rule in favor of showing actual bias in Turner v. University of Utah Hosp. &
Clinics, 2013 UT 52, iJ~25-32, 310 P.3d 1212. Even if Waldoch had
challenged his counsel's use of peremptory challenges, his claim would still
fail for the same reasons his voir dire claim fails: lack of prejudice because
no biased juror sat.
7
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questions that were asked. See R298:7-45. And as stated, Waldoch has not
proven prejudice because he has not shown that a biased juror sat. King,
2008 UT 54,

F.

if if15-36.

Defendant has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance
regarding jury admonishments because he has not shown
that the jury violated the court's admonitions.

No plain error. Waldoch next argues that the trial court plainly erred
by not fully admonishing the jury before each recess.

Br.Aplt. 40, 42.

Though the error here was likely plain, it was not prejudicial.
Rule 17(k), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that at "each
recess of the court, ... the jurors ... be admonished by the court that it is
their duty not to converse among themselves, or suffer themselves to be
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them."

Maestas held that rule 17(k) "clearly imposes a

mandatory requirement on the trial court." 2012 UT 46, ,rs1 n.34. Thus, the
trial court's missing or incomplete admonishments constituted obvious
error, at least for those recesses of longer than a few minutes. 8

Because the court found no prejudice, Maestas did not reach the
State's argument in that case that the meaning of "recess" under the rule
should not include breaks of short length. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,rs1 n.34.
8
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But Waldoch has not proven prejudice-that is, that the jurors
violated the admonishments they did receive. Maestas, 2012 UT 46,

if 54.

Waldoch speculates that they might have discussed the case or been
prejudiced by another juror's views. Br.Aplt. 33 (discussing "potential risk"
and "heightened risk" from missing admonitions arising from spouse
jurors). But proof of prejudice must be real, not speculative. State v. Chacon,
962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998); see also Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ,121, 194 P.3d
903 (" [P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative
matter, but must be a demonstrable reality.") (citation and quotation
omitted). Waldoch' s plain error arguments thus fail.

No ineffective assistance.
was

ineffective

for

Waldoch alternatively claims that counsel

not objecting

to

inadequacies

in the

court's

admonishments or lack of "follow-up" on them. Br.Aplt. 40, 42. He has not
shown deficient performance because counsel could have decided that the
opening instructions adequately instructed the jury on their duties during
recesses, and that the jury would not have had much opportunity to violate
the adn1onitions given where the trial lasted only two days and about half
of the recesses were fifteen minutes or less. Cf Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,I 53
(explaining in failure-to-admonish case that most recesses were brief and
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the "jury would have had little opportunity to forget prior admonitions,
engage in discussion, or be exposed to extraneous information").
And again, Waldoch has not shown prejudice because he has not
demonstrated that the jurors actually violated the admonitions given. See,

e.g., Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 53 (no prejudice from nine failures to admonish);
Richardson, 817 F.2d at 889-90 (no prejudice from two failures to admonish);
Viale, 312 F.2d at 602 (no prejudice from failure to admonish); Nelson, 102
F.3d at 1347-48 (no prejudice from total lack of admonishments); Rotolo, 404
F.2d at 317 (no prejudice from failure to admonish before lunch recess);

Weatherd, 699 F.2d at 962 (no prejudice from single failure to admonish);
Hart, 729 F.2d at 668 (no prejudice from two failures to admonish); Campbell,
63 Cal.App.3d at 610 (no prejudice from three failures to admonish); Bean,
560 N.E.2d at 280-81 (no prejudice from failure to admonish before weekend
recess); Ralls, 515 P.2d at 1209-10 (no prejudice from failure to admonish);

Curtis, 2015 WL 630396, *4 (no prejudice from failures to admonish); Deck,
136 S.W.3d at 486-87 (no prejudice from multiple failures to admonish);

Blake, 121 P.3d at 579 (no prejudice from six failures to admonish);
Thibodeaux, 459 S.E.2d at 507 (no prejudice from failure to admonish); cf
Hines, 307 P.2d at 889 (presuming regularity of proceedings where record
did not show admonishment before dinner break); Miracle, 1986 WL 13268,
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*2 (holding no prejudice from husband and wife sitting on jury where no
evidence that they discussed case during recesses). Tellingly, Waldoch has
not moved for remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
to make a record of any violation.
In sum, Waldoch has failed to establish plain error or ineffective
assistance regarding jury selection or admonishment.

III.
Defendant has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance
in the prosecutor's closing argument because the prosecutor
merely argued permissible inferences from the evidence.

Waldoch next argues that the trial court plainly erred and counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by not interrupting the prosecutor's closing
argument on the ground that it "vouched for the truthfulness of the victim"
and appealed to the jurors' "passion and prejudice" by asking them to "'put
themselves in the victim's place." Br.Aplt. 37-39. He further argues that the
trial court should have sua sponte admonished the jury before closing
arguments that they were the judges of credibility, the statements of counsel
were not evidence, that it was not "appropriate" to feel "sorry for the victiln
or resentful of" him. Id. at 37.
These arguments are all unpreserved and inadequately briefed. At
any rate, Waldoch has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance.
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A. Closing arguments on the victim's credibility. 9

Both parties addressed the victim's credibility m closing.

The

prosecutor based his credibility argument on the credibility factors in the
jury instructions.

See R306.

First, the prosecutor briefly addressed

Waldoch' s and the victim's respective "personal interest[s]": Waldoch had
an interest in avoiding conviction due to potential jail time and sex offender
registration, and the victim had an interest in not being branded a liar
because she "probably wouldn't feel very good about that." R299:274-75.
When the prosecutor started to ask that the jury weigh those respective
interests, defense counsel asked to approach the bench. Id. at 275. After the
unrecorded bench conference, the prosecutor moved on to discuss "other
bias," stating that Waldoch had a motive to lie because had told his wife
that "he just cheated on her," but it would "[p]robably" affect his marriage
if "actually he sexually assaulted another woman." Id. at 276. For the
victim's part, the prosecutor reasserted that the victim had an interest in
being considered truthful. Id. at 275.
The prosecutor then discussed de1neanor, arguing that a show of
emotion was a good way "to tell if" someone was "lying or not." R299:276.
He alluded to the victim's demeanor on the stand, saying that if she were

9

The closing arguments are attached as Addendum B.
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lying, her emotion would "have to be fake, totally made up," but that if she
were telling the truth, then it was "was legitimate and sincere." Id.

He

suggested that the jury ask themselves "how [they felt] about that." Id. The
prosecutor then argued that the victim had told a consistent and reasonable
story, as evidenced by both her statements and her actions. Id. at 276-77.
Finally, the prosecutor argued that the victim was believable because she
had subjected herself to the embarrassment of a pelvic exam and
participating in the case for over two-and-a-half years. Id. at 277.
In response, defense counsel argued that the victim had not reacted
consistently with her story because she did not stop and run away or try get
help.

Id. at 288-91.

He also argued that alleged inconsistencies in her

accounts, her taking Waldoch home, and her refusing medication at the
hospital belied her story. Id. at 291-94.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that "every rape victim, every
sexual assault victim is different in how they respond" to abuse, and not to
"blame her for what happened to her." Id. at 295. He also responded that
small inconsistencies in the victim's account did not render it incredible. Id.
at 296-99.
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B.

These claims are unpreserved and inadequately briefed.

As explained, rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
requires an appellant to present the "contentions and reasons" for
overturning a judgment, including the grounds for reaching unpreserved
arguments. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ,r21 (requiring unpreserved claims to
be briefed "through the lens" of an exception).
Waldoch argues these claims as if they were preserved. They were
not-he did not object below to the prosecutor's closing argument, nor did
he request any curative instruction. See R299:274-86 (prosecutor. closing),
295-301 (prosecutor rebuttal). Waldoch appears to claim that these issues
are preserved because "[t]hese matters were likely discussed as defense
counsel requested that the attorneys approach the bench." Br.Aplt. 37. 10
But there is no record of what occurred during that bench conference. See
R299:275.
An appellant may not found preservation on speculation. Rather, he
must make a complete record of objections, and where no record exists of an
actual objection, an appellant must supplement or complete the record. See
Utah R. App. P. ll(c) (describing appellant's burden to ensure an adequate
record on appeal); Utah R. App. P. 11(h) (providing for record completion
In support of this, Waldoch cites R299:175. This appears to be a
typo. R299:175 contains no bench conference, but R299:275 does.
JO
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II

II

where something is missing from the record due to error" or accident");
Utah R. App. P. 23B (providing for record supplementation in support of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims).

In the absence of a record, the

presumption of regularity attaches and record gaps are construed in favor
of the judgment below. See In re Adoption of Connor, 2007 UT 33, ~16, 158
P.3d 1097 ("When faced with questions about proceedings in the trial court
that are not adequately challenged on appeal, we apply a presumption of
regularity," which assumes that "the evidence and process employed were
sufficient"); Litherland, 2000 UT 76, if17 (holding that record inadequacies
are consh·ued in favor of counsel's effective performance).
Because Waldoch assumes that these issues were preserved, he does
not argue plain error or ineffective assistance. For these reasons alone, his
claim is inadequately briefed, and fails to meet his burden of persuasion on
appeal. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, if18. But even if this Court were to overlook
Waldoch's briefing failures, he could only prevail on this claim-as with his
other unpreserved claims - by showing plain error or ineffective assistance.
Waldoch has not shown either.
C.

A prosecutor does not err, let alone commit misconduct, by
arguing permissible inferences from the evidence.

Waldoch styles this claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct.
Br.Aplt. 37.

Granted, that label has been employed to describe a broad
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range of alleged prosecutor errors, from the remarkable to the mundane.
But it is a misnomer to speak of prosecutorial "misconduct" outside of
"those extreme - and thankfully rare- instances where a prosecutor's
conduct actually violates the rules of professional conduct."

People v.

McCranJ, Docket No. 308237, 2013 WL 2662752, *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jun. 13,

2013) (per curiam).
True prosecutorial misconduct "is not merely the result of legal error,
negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety . . . . . " Pool v. Superior

Court, 677 P.2d 261, 271-72 (Ariz. 1984). Rather, it is conduct that, "taken as
a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be
improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose
with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial." Id. Thus,
most "misconduct claims" are "better and more fairly described as claims of
'professional error' with only the most extreme cases rising to the level of
'prosecutorial misconduct."'

McCran;, 2013 WL 2662752, *3; see generally

Utah R. Prof'l Conduct 3.8 (special responsibilities of prosecutors).
Waldoch alleges error in the prosecutor's closing argument. On a
preserved claim, a defendant proves error only if a prosecutor, s closing
remarks (1) "call to the attention of the jurors matters they would not be
justified in considering in determining their verdict," and, (2) a reasonable
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likelihood of a different result absent the remark(s).

State v. Tillman, 750

P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). But because this claim is unpreserved, Waldoch
must show not just error, but obvious and prejudicial error from the
allegedly improper remarks. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, if39,
322 P.3d 761 (holding no plain error from prosecutor's remarks).
Alternatively, he must show ineffective assistance of counsel, which as
explained, requires both (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice.
Both prosecutors and defense counsel have "considerable latitude" in
closing argument and "may discuss fully from their viewpoints the
evidence and the inferences and deductions therefrom." Tillman, 750 P.2d
at 560 (citation omitted). Even if the remarks are "colloquial, vigorous, and
colorful," they may nevertheless fall "within the wide latitude permitted to
counsel in presenting closing arguments to the jury." State v. Bryant, 965
P.2d 539, 550 (Utah App. 1998); see also Tillman, 750 P.2d at 556 (holding no
misconduct where prosecutor responded to "vigorous attack" on credibility
of State's witness with "unwise and hyperbolic" remark referencing
Mormon Tabernacle Choir).
A prosecutor crosses the line if he gives a personal opinion on the
strength of the evidence or a witness's credibility, see, e.g., State v. Hopkins,
782 P.2d 475,479 (Utah 1989) (holding improper prosecutor's remark that he
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was "plainly impressed" with the case evidence); State v. Thompson, 2014 UT
App 14, if 57, 318 P.3d 1221 (holding improper prosecutor's remark that he
thought witness was credible); or appeals to the jury's sympathies by asking
them to put themselves in the victim's shoes. See, e.g., State v. Todd, 2007 UT
App 349, ifl9, 173 P.3d 170.
But he is well in-bounds to argue reasonable inferences from the
evidence.

See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255-56 (Utah 1988)

(holding no error from prosecutor's argument containing "nothing more
than his inferences drawn from the evidence"); Thompson, 2014 UT App 14,
if if 51-55 (same, where prosecutor argued that the jury "had an opportunity
to view" the victiin and "see that she was forthright," and "told . . . the
truth").
When a defendant objects, the trial court must decide whether the
remarks were proper or not. But in the absence of an objection, the need to
show deference to counsel's strategy has made appellate courts "hesitant to
set a rule which would require the trial judge to intervene in a closing
argument whenever the judge believes a misstatement of the evidence ...
has occurred." State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 344 (Utah App. 1993). That is
the province of opposing counsel. Id. A court invades that province only
when it can articulate no reasonable basis for not objecting.
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See State v.

Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah App. 1998) (citing multiple reasonable bases
for not objecting). Moreover, plain error requires that the error be obvious.
Because "[t]he line which separates acceptable from improper advocacy is
often difficult to draw," the challenged remark must be "so obviously
improper" that the trial court had to intervene sua sponte. State v. Larsen,
2005 UT App 201,

,rs,

113 P.3d 998 (citations and additional quotation

marks omitted). This same standard applies to whether counsel performed
deficiently in not objecting. Hall, 946 P.2d at 720 (noting that "if an error
was not obvious to the trial court, it most likely was not obvious to trial
counsel").
In assessing the prejudice of improper remarks, this Court considers
all the evidence and the arguments of counsel, as well as any ameliorative
measures, such as defense counsel's addressing the allegedly improper
remarks in their closing and any curative instruction from the trial court.

Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, if if 6-10. Considering the totality of evidence is
important because "[i]solated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in
advance to the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, ... are seldom
carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently
results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear."

Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 646-47; see also United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33
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(1988).

"[A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an

ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting
through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of
less damaging interpretations." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647
(1974).

And the trial court and counsel hold an advantaged position in

evaluating the impact of any statements on the jury. See State v. Langshaw,
961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah App. 1998). Thus, appellate courts do not "lightly
overturn[]" a criminal conviction "on the basis of a prosecutor's statements
standing alone." Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, if 6.
In sum, to get reversal on plain error, Waldoch must show that the
prosecutor so obviously misstated the evidence or argued something so
obviously improper that the trial court was required to interrupt and correct
the argument without being invited to rule on an objection first. See State v.

Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ,I35, 275 P.3d 1050. He must then show a reasonable
likelihood of a different result absent the allegedly improper arguments.
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 555.

And as stated, to prove ineffective assistance on these same clahns,
Waldoch must show both (1) deficient perfonnance and (2) the same sort of
prejudice applicable to his plain error clailn.
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D. Defendant has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance
because the prosecutor properly argued the victim's
credibility based on permissible inferences from the
evidence.
Waldoch alleges that two improprieties in the prosecutor's closing
required the trial court and/ or counsel to act: (1) that the prosecutor "went
too far endorsing the victim's position and arguing that the Appellant was
not credible," thereby expressing a "personal opinion"; and (2) appealed "to
how the victim would feel if" the jury "determined that she was lying and
having them relive this shocking experience from her point of view."
Br.Aplt. 38-39. Waldoch has not shown any error, let alone plain error,
because the prosecutor did not offer personal credibility opinions or appeal
to the jury's sympathies, but rather argued reasonable inferences from the
evidence. State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ~57, 979 P.2d 799 (holding that the
prosecutor can make "assertions about what the jury should infer from the
evidence during their deliberations."). For these same reasons, he has not
shown ineffective assistance.

No plain error. It was reasonable to infer the victim's candor based on
her demeanor, her consistent account, and her enduring an embarrassing
pelvic exam and drmvn-out legal proceedir1gs. R299:276-77; see Thompson,
2014 UT App 14, ~,I53-55 (holding proper prosecutor's remarks that jury
had "opportunity to view" the victim and could "see that she was
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forthright," "had nothing to gain from lying," and "told ... the truth").
Likewise, it was reasonable to infer Waldoch' s lack of candor from the legal
and marital consequences he faced if found guilty. See, e.g., Clark, 2014 UT
App 56, ifif37-38 (holding no plain error in prosecutor's "suggesting that
Defendant had a motive to lie and that Defendant's account was fabricated
and absurd"); Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, if 59 (holding prosecutor fairly
argued that defendant was "lying, lying," because he had "a lot at stake,"
and "everything to gain by lying"). It was also reasonable to infer from the
evidence that the victim arguably had a motive to lie because-assuming
she had lied from the get-go - she would need to continue the lie in order to
avoid being found out. Cf Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if if30-31 (holding no
plain error in alleged appeal to jury sympathy where prosecutor
encouraged jury to "walk in [the victim's] shoes" as a seven-year-old
witness). Being found out and branded as a liar would make most people
feel badly.

Thus, there was no error, let alone obvious error, in the

prosecutor's argument.
Waldoch also argues-without citation to any authority-that the
trial court ought to have instructed the jurors before closing arguments that
(1) the statements of the prosecutor were not evidence; (2) they were the
judges of witness credibility; and (3) that "any appeal to emotion ... was
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not appropriate."

Br.Aplt. 37.

There was no error-let alone obvious

error-here, because the trial court's opening instructions effectively
covered this ground.
The jurors were instructed that it was their role to "decide the factual
issues and to not be influenced by the opinions of the court or counsel; that
closing arguments represented counsels' summary of their "respective
views of the evidence"; that they should base their verdict only on facts in
evidence; that "[w]hat the lawyers say is not evidence"; and to [c]onsider
the evidence fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side" See R30610 (second emphasis added). Particularly in the absence of a request from
counsel to cover it again, it would not have been obvious that the jurors
would have forgotten their charge the day before. And even if the jurors
had been re-instructed as Waldoch claims they should have been, it would
have made no difference in the result where the victim's story was
consistent with her injuries and behavior, and Waldoch showed no
plausible motive for her to fabricate the allegations against him.

See

Statement of Facts.
In sum, Waldoch has shown no error, let alone obvious error. And
even if there were some error, the remarks that Waldoch appears to
challenge would have made no difference in the result where the remarks
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were brief, Waldoch had an opportunity to respond to them, the jury was
instructed that the statements of counsel were not evidence, and the
evidence of Waldoch's guilt was strong. R307; see generally Larsen, 2005 UT
App 201,

iJif 6-10.

No ineffective assistance. Because the prejudice standard for ineffective
assistance is the same as that for plain error, Waldoch' s ineffective
assistance argument fails on the same bases. Further, Waldoch has shown
neither deficient performance nor prejudice because the prosecutor's
argument was proper, rendering any objection futile. State v. Kelley, 2000
UT 41,

'if 26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel."). And even if there were some arguable
impropriety, counsel could also have reasonably chosen not to object in
order to avoid drawing attention to the remark or being seen as
obstructionist. See Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ,I,I36-40 (holding no ineffective
assistance from failure to object to proper argument and discussing possible
strategic purposes for withholding objection).
IV.

Trial counsel effectively used a highly-qualified expert to
support the defense of consent, and any alleged deficiencies
are entirely speculative.

Waldoch finally argues that his counsel was ineffective because he
did not "not fully appreciate or make use of" his expert's "impressions
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about consensual versus nonconsensual findings" where she "had more to
say."

Br.Aplt. 40, 42.

This argument is inadequately briefed under the

standards discussed above. Though Waldoch cites to the correct standard
for ineffective assistance, he does not adequately apply it to the facts of this
case because he does not explain what counsel left undone and why counsel
was constitutionally required to ask more than he did. See Br.Aplt. 40-41.
And though he addresses prejudice relating to his other arguments, see, e.g.,
Br.Aplt. 43, he does not even cursorily address prejudice on this argument.
Under the standards discussed above, this falls well short of meeting his
burden of persuasion under rule 24.
At any rate, the record shows that counsel adequately used his
highly-qualified expert to support a consent defense. Ms. Byner-Brown was
a longtime forensic nurse examiner who had conducted more than 4,000
rape exams over 20 years and helped to design the Code-R kit used on the
victim here. R299:210-12. Counsel consulted her during the State's case to
prepare for cross-examination. See R298:104; R299:206-07. Her testimony
helped to counter the emergency room doctor's opinion that the victim's
vital signs were abnormally high; explained that the victim's bruises could
have been accidental and unrelated to the alleged abuse; and minimized the
State's nurse expert's testimony about the seriousness of the victim's
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vaginal injuries and the extent to which they were consistent with her story.
R299:217-30.
This far surpasses counsel's efforts in State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, 262
P.3d 1, to which Waldoch compares this case. Br.Aplt. 41-42. In Lenkart,
counsel was held to be ineffective for failing to test a Code-R kit and hire an
expert to opine on the significance of the results, which supported the
defense.

Lenkart, 2011 UT 27,

,r,r3S,

41.

Here, counsel hired a highly-

qualified expert and had her extensively opine on the extent of the victim's
injuries, their consistency with her story, and the validity of other medical
providers' opinions. Because anything else the expert would or could have
said is unknown, it is speculative to find counsel's performance either
deficient or prejudicial.

See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (explaining that

ineffective assistance claim must not be speculative).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on July 13, 2015.
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Addenda

Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

RULE 17. THE TRIAL. UT R RCRP Rule 17

West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17
RULE 17. THE TRIAL

Currentness
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right 10 appear and defend in person and by counsel The defendant shall be
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions

(a)( I) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence;

(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not pu111shable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have
the same effect as if defendant had been present; and

(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous,
or obstreperous conduct
Upon appl icat1on of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial.

(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order

(b)( I) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;

(b)(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody,

(b)(3) felony cases when defendant 1s on bail or recognizance; and

(b)('I) misdemeanor cases when defendant 1s on bail or recognizance

(c) A II felony cases shall be tned by jury unless the defendant waives a Jury in open court with the approval of the court and
the consent of the prosecution

vi

(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the
court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial ofan infraction

RULE 17. THE TRIAL, UT R RCRP Rule 17
----- .... --·--·- ....... ---- .•..... ·-·---·•·-··-·-·--··-···-··--··-·-·--·-------····-·•---·--··------------------

(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953.

(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation
in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of jurors less
than otherwise required.

(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following order:

(g)( I) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;

(g){2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may make an opening statement or reserve
it until the prosecution has rested;

(g}(3} The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;

(g)( 4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;

(g)(S) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits;

(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and

(g)(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the
argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. The court may set
reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument.

{h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using
the alternate juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining.
Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered.

(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a witness as provided in this section.

(i)( I) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its role
as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from a juror
and may discontinue questions from jurors at any lime.

(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the jurors that they may write the question as it
occurs to them and submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the jurors that some
questions might not be allowed.

j
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(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the question.
The judge may disallow a question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question in the
court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The
question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the witness
alter the juror's question.

(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been

committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an
officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall
be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak to them
nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a
specified time.

(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by
the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by,
any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case
is finally submitted to them.

(I) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been
received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits
ofunusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take
notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall provide jurors with
writing materials anu instruct the jury on taking and using notes

(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some convenient place under charge of an
officer until they agree upon a verdict or arc discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the court,
the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except
to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person
the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.

(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the cou11. The court may then direct that the JUI)'
be brought before the court where, in the presence or the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry
or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion

respond to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response
thereto shal I be entered in the record.

(o) If the verdict rcndcn:J by a jury is mcorrect on its face, it m:1y be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or
the jury may be sent out again.

·~

(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the com1 may issue an order
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof~ upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense
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[Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.]

Editors' Notes

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Paragraph (/). The committee recommends amending paragraph (/) to establish the right of jurors to take notes and to have
those notes with them during deliberations. The committee recommends removing depositions from the paragraph not in order
to permit the jurors to have depositions but to recognize that depositions are not evidence. Depositions read into evidence will
be treated as any other oral testimony. These amendments and similar amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure will make
the two provisions identical.
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§ 76-5-402.2. Object rape, UT ST § 76-5-402.2
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 5. Offenses Against the Person (Refs & Annos)
Part 4. Sexual Offenses (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-402.2
§

76-5-402.2. Object rape

Currentness
(I) A person who, without the victim's consent, causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of another
person who is 14 years of age or older, by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, including a part of the human
body other than the mouth or genitals, with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to the victim or with the intent
to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, commits an offense which is a first degree felony, punishable by a tenn
of imprisonment of:

(a) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b) or (c), not less than five years and which may be for life;

(b) except as provided in Subsection ( I )(c) or (2), 15 years and which may be for life, if lhe trier of facl finds that:

(i) during the course of the commission of the object rape the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or

(ii) at the time of the commission of the object rape, the defendant was younger than 18 years of age and was previously
convicted of a grievous sexual offense; or

(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission of the object rape, the defendant was
previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense.

(2) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection ( I )(b ), a court finds that a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (I)
(b) is in the interests ofjustice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment
of not less than:

(a) IO years and which may be for life; or

(h) six years and which may be for life.

(3) The provisions of Subsection (2) do not apply when a person is sentenced under Subsection ( I )(a) or (c).

(4) Imprisonment under Subsection ( I )(b), ( I )(c), or (2) is mandatory

111

accordance with Section 76-3-406.

§ 76-5-402.2. Object rape, UT ST § 76-5-402.2

Credits
Laws 1983, c. 88, § 19; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 8; Laws 2007, c. 339, § 14, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 340, § 1, eff. May
S, 2008; Laws 2013, c. 81, § 6, eff. May 14, 2013.
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1

if you were going to decide the case, because you still may,

2

all right?

3

How closing arguments works is we first hear from the

4

prosecution.

5

Mr. Leigh and the defense will speak to you.

6

has the opportunity to speak to you again.

7

to chances -- there are two reasons for that.

8

State bears the burden of proof.

9

and second is because in fairness each side should have the

He will speak to you, Mr.. VanDyke, and then
Then Mr. VanDyke
The reason he gets
One is Lhat the

So he gets two opportunities;

10

opportunity to respond to what the other side has said.

11

first we' 11 hear from Mr. Van Dyke an·d then from Mr. Leigh.

12

Mr. VanDyke.

13

MR. VANDYKE: Thank you, your Honor.

So

Thank you all. for

14

being here.

15

makes sure that we have the greatest criminal justice system,

16

which we do.

17

even though it was difficult, not just to give up two days in

18

your lives, but because of what you had to listen to while you

19

were here.

Thanks for coming back.

Again, your participation

So thanks for being here and paying attention,

20

It's my chance to -- it's my last chance to persuade

21

you, to help you see the importanL things that I've seen com~

22

through, and to help you as you later deliberate, maybe some of

23

th~ things you should di~cuss.

24

25

This has turned out a little bit interesting, I think.
You've heard a lot of people testify that weren't there, that
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1

don't know what happened, but they gathered some evidence.

2

That's a little bit helpful for you in making your decision.

3

There's DNA evidence that:'s pretty conclusive that defendant

4

was t:here and he ejaculated.

5

occurred.

6

victim's story; but you could also disregard that stuff.

7

According to the vie -- the expert that testified today,

8

you could also disregard a lot of those injuries.

9

is going to be up to you to decide how important all that

10

There's some injuries that

They support the victim's story,

the alleged

So that

(inaudible) is.

11

So the crux of the case comes down to who are you

12

going to believe?

13

the story that he told you today, or are you going to believe

14

the alleged victim and the story t:hat she told you?

15

Are you going to believe the defendant and

If you look in your instructions, on No. 12 there's

16

an instruction that helps you to ~hink about some of the things

17

on how to make that decision.

18

victim, the alleged victim and not the defendant, obviously.

19

Here's some good things to think about, okay?

I'm asking you to believe the

20

Personal interest.

21

interest in how the trial comes ou~?

22

a personal interest in how this trial comes out?

23

Right?

24

interested in the outcome today.

25

propensicy to not tell the truth?

Does the witness have a personal
Does the defendant have

There's so much at stake for him.

Absolutely.

He's personally

So does that mean he has a
Absolutely he does.
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The victim, the alleged victim, Melissa Sorenson, does

1

2

she have a personal interest in how the trial comes out?

3

she probably does, because she's made a statement.

4

that same statement here in Court.

5

sexually assaulted, and if you decided that she was a liar then

6

she would probably feel like she was a liar or she probably

7

wouldn't feel very good about that.

8

personal interest, too.

9

Yeah,

She's made

She's claiming that she was

So she kind of has a

Now, weigh that against the defendant's inter:est of,

10

you know, not going to jail, not being a sex offender.

11

to think about that and weigh that out.

12

witness have some other bias or

You get

Otherwise, does the

13

MR. LEIGH: Your Honor, may we approach.

14

(Discussion at the bench off ~he record>

15

MR. VANDYKE: Okay, other bias.

Does Melissa Sorenson

16

have some other bias to testify a certain way?

17

another bias or motive to testify a certain way?

18

bias that would make her lie today.

19

exist.

20

happened to her.

21

keep the same story, right, because she probably wouldn't want

22

to make people think she's a liar.

23

keep the same slory.

24

if she lied the very first time, right?

25

Does she have
Okay, some

I supposed that could

I mean, she's told friends, she's told people what
If she lied to them, she'd probably have to

So she's probably going to

So sure, maybe sh~ has some other bias,

Does the defendant have some other bias or motive to
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1

testify a certain way?

2

told his wife about this circumstance and played it off to her

3

that he j~st cheated on her.

4

no, actually he sexually assaulted another woman,

5

to affect his relationship with his wife?

6

Now,

Apparently he

if it came out today that
is that going

Probably.

Demeanor. You saw both of them testify today. There's
not really a good way,

8

they're lying or not. Sometimes we have impressions, especially

9

when people get emotional.

11

just by looking at somebody, to tell if

That's often -- you know, you can

tell if that emotion is fake or real.
So remember what you saw from Ms. Sorenson and how

12

she acted en the stand; and if she was lying,

13

have to be fake,

14

that she displayed to you, completely fake.

15

the truth, then the emotion she showed to you was legitimate

16

and sincere.

17

totally made up by her,

that would all

all of the emotion
If she was telling

So ask yourself how you feel about that.

Consistency.

Look and see if their statements

18

if their stories were consistent, acknowledging memory and

19

reasonableness.

You know,

20

to think about.

Go through the story and ask which one of them

21

is reasonable.

22

@

He told his wife.

7

10

@

Sure.

reasonableness is going to be one

So that's something you can consider.

So in regards to Melissa Sorenson,

if she were lying,

23

and she initiated the sexual contact, why wo~ld she later be --

24

s~ay at home in bed for two days over at Atkinsons?

25

she then when she was contacted by friends tell them that she

Why would
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1

was sexually assaulted?

2

Why would she then go to the emergency room, subject

3

herself to this really horrible exam, you know, even the expert

4

witness that you listened to today said that was terrible.

5

You know, you get up there, yo·.1' re sitting in stirrups while

6

somebody's exe1111ining yout pelvic area.

7

herself to that if she were lying?

8

have for that?

9

Why would she subject

What motivation could she

I want you to think about that.

t<lhy would she -- I mean, it happened in 2011, Memorial

10

Day 2011.

11

mean, this has been an outstanding case since that time.

12

would she subject herself to that if she -- if this was all a

13

lie?

14

to discuss and think about.

15

Here it is, start of 2014.

She's been involved -- I
Why

That's a question I think that's really important for you

®

There's a lot of evidence in this case, a lot of

16

exhibits, a lot of stuff for you to look through, and you'll

17

have that opportunity.

18

everybody's statements, go over everybody's reports.

19

You'll have the opportunity to read

Let me talk for a minute about the DNA report, okay?

20

It's really confusing.

21

times.

22

she did a really good job of explaining that to you.

23

read that report it's not going to be as easy to understand.

24

So let me go back over that part.

25

I've read it through myself several

You know, I've sat -- you listened to the expert, and
When you

®

The important thing to remembe.r. f=om the DNA evidence

-277-

1

is t.hat there were two different submissions.

2

pa~t from the first submission, that rape kit, is the neck

3

swab, and then the second submission wit.h the sweater.

4

The important

The first test that the DNA expert goes over is the

@

5

serology, but that's just to determine if there are bodily

6

fluids, okay?

7

saliva; and on the sweater she found (inaudible).

8

second part of the test is to determine that there's -- if

9

there's DNA that match -- well, not that it {inaudible), but

10

So she had a central sample from Melissa Sorenson,

12

that she knew that it was Melissa Sorenson, that she had her

13

DNA.

14

had to see if his DNJl.. compared, okay?

15

saliva showed Melissa Sorenson's DNA is a match, and some other

16

person.

17

the major profile, and someone else was the minor profile,

18

okay?

19

came from.

20

sweater.

21

@

Then the

to match the DNA.

11

®

On the next swab she found that there was

She also had the mouth swab from the defendant that she
The next swab that shows

The minor profile is how she -- Melissa Sorenson was

We don't know if !twas saliva or skin that those DNA
We just know Lhat Lhose two DN.l\. came from the

When they did -- when she did the DNA sample of the

22

sweater, the seminal fluid, okay, she separates that into two

23

because she found -- on that. one she could determine yes, there

24

is DNA from specifically serninaj fluid.

25

fraction, and there's also DNA from the skin, an epithelial

So that's the serninal
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1

fraction.

2

Unlike the DNA from the saliva when they can't tell where the

3

DNA comes from on this, on the sweater they can tell, yes, this

4

is from the seminal fluid, the sperm, and this is from skin

5

cells, right?

6

Because of the way they can test, they can tell.

The sperm came back as a match to Paul Waldoch, and

7

then the skin, there was Melissa Waldoch and someone else's

8

{inaudible).

9

If I rubbed my hand on your shoulder, my skin DNA would get on

10

your clothes.

Please don't get too concerned about that, okay?

That's what the DNA experts told us, okay?

11

You know, maybe the defense attorney's going to get up

12

here and say, "Oh, well, there was some huge orgy going on, and

13

there must have been all sorts of people, you know, brushing

14

up against her and doing all sorts of things."

15

all, there's no evidence of that.

16

"Yeah,

17

we drank.

18

of your mind, okay?

19

important part, okay?

20

(inaudible) party.

Well, first of

The defendant himself says,

We sat, you know, we watched TV and

Then in the morning we left," okay?

So put that out

His sperm is on her sweater.

That's the

Some other important instructions for you to review is

21

starting at 29, Count I ar.d the elements that I have to prove;

22

30 is Count I!; 31 is Count III.

23

prove that the defendant Paul Waldoch -- that's proven, okay,

24

no question about it.

25

On each one of them I have to

On each count I have to prove that it was with the
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1

intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,

2

okay?

3

have told you that he ejaculated, okay?

4

not (inaudible)

5

that happens to a male, that's usually beca~se of a sexual

6

gratification, right?

7

right?

8

! mean,

I'm

you know, go back to sexed 101, but when

So that's pretty easy to determine,

On object rape I have to prove that Paul Waldoch
caused the penetration however slight of the genital opening.

10

So when they were there at the Zion's Call Center and Melissa

11

Sorenson said, "This time when he stuck his hand in my pants he

12

put his finger inside my vagina," that's Count I for you there.

13

She's another person.

14

finally wondering why I asked if she was over 14, that's why,

15

okay?

She's over 14 years of age.

If you're

So critical element on Count 1, without the victim's

17

consent, okay?

18

says, "She initiated this with me,n and while he claims that he

19

didn't put his finger in her vagina

20

that's really (inaudible).

21

@

There's

9

16

®

Both witnesses, both Melissa So?enson and Paul Waldoch

Then I come back to {inaudible).

u

The defendant

on Count I, okay --

On Count II, the specific act, while they were driving

22

he takes his hand -- he's rubbing on her.

23

under her shirt and touches both of her breasts.

24

tcuches ~he nipples, according to her testimony, okay:

25

on element two that's satisfied by ULuucheJ the breasL of a

He sticks his hand
He even
So
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1

female."

2

On Count III, this is where they're also at the parking

3

lot.

4

on his penis, he has his hand around her hand and he's going up

5

and down and he ejaculates on her, okay?

6

that's -- the last part of that sentence, "he caused another to

7

take indecent liberties with the actor er another."

8

additional instruction that tells you how to determine what an

9

indecent liberty is.

10
11

He has his penis out.

He grabs her hand, sticks her hand

Under element No. 2,

There's an

Please don't spend time on that, right?

That's an indecent liberty, if there ever was one.
So

what happened?

What happened?

On May 29 th of 2011

12

Melissa Sorenson went to work that evening at a restaurant.

13

She had a whole shift that day, she was tired.

14

home she stopped at a gas station and saw her friend Bill,

15

and with Bill was the defendant Paul Waldoch.

16

brief conversation wh~re Bill invited Melissa to his house

17

for some drinks.

18

On her way

They had a

Melissa is -- she has some kids that live with her

19

and they weren't with her at that time.

20

some time with their dad.

21

decided to go to Bill's house.

22

up, and then went td her friend Bill's house -- Bill's mom's

23

house, just to the north end of Kanab.

24
25

They were spending

So she had a free weekend.

So she

She first went home to freshen

She had some drinks enough that she didn't feel
comfortable driving home:.

She tried to yet a ride home, but
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1

Bill's mother was asleep, and so she waited it out.

2

some water, and then at 7 a.m. she felt comfortable enough

3

to drive home.

4

couldn't drive home because he was -- he still had too much

5

alcohol in his system, so he asked for a ride home.

6

in the car with Melissa, and they come out -- (inaudible)?

The defendant Paul Waldoch was there and he

He gets

7

MR. HANNA: Yes.

8

THE COURT: Sorry, Mr. Hanna, you close your eyes and

9

10

Judge ordered me, sorry.

I know you may or may not be, but it looks like you're fighting
to doze off, so --

11

MR. VANDYKE: I'~ trying to be interesting here.

12

MR. HANNA: No, no, no, no.

13

MR. VANDYKE: Okay, so they get out on the road and

14

he says, "Take a left,• on Highway 89.

15

Nothing.

16

that direction.

She's not a dummy.

She's heard before that

17

he lives on the other side of town.

So she turns right, and

18

essentially right at that point he starts to assault her.

19

rubbing her and he's touching her and he says -- what does he

20

say?

21

I saw you."

22

@

She drank

What's that direction?

Ask yourself why he asked

why he told her to go

He's

He says, "I've been waiting for this since the first time

She's driving.

23

She keeps saying,

24

stops a couple times.

25

or.e place she

She drives.

She's all over the road.

'No, den' t touch me."

n;;:ncmbers

They keep drive -- she

Where does she remember st.opping?

The

stopp:: ng ;ias at Holl.5:.,"Jn' s Trail' s End,
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1

a restaurant down here in town.

2

did she remember stopping there?

3

right?

4

stopping in front of a restaurant, okay?

5

Now, why does Houston's -- why
She's -- she's a waitress,

She's at restaurants all the time,

They keep driving.

so she remembers

H~ keeps, you know, putting his

6

hand down her shirt, putting his hand down her pants.

7

ally they pull into this parking lot here at the Zion's Call

8

Center, okay?

9

you're wondering why do they stop there?

What's past that?

Not much.

Eventu-

So if

Okay.

There at the other

10

side of Kanab and maybe subconsciously she knows MI can't drive

11

past that point.

12

she's looking at other people,

13

two thoughts that are going through her head, okay?

There's nothing out there.ff

This whole time

looking at cars.

Those are the

14

Eventually she gets to a point where she stops, and

15

that's where Mr. Waldoch puts his hand inside of her vagina,

16

and he pulls out his penis, grabs her hand, sticks her hand

17

on his penis, and eventually ejaculates.

18

out of her car, but he kind of indicates where to go towards

19

his house.

20

He still won't get

She drives a little bit further and drops him off.

Now, were there -- do you think there were no people

21

out there that morning and no cars out at all?

22

past guic.e a lot of businesses,

23

too early, okay?

24

were no people," but he says there were cars.

25

were cars.

Now,

Now, she drove

right, at: 7 a.m.

the defendant also says,

That's not
"Yeah,

t:1ere

I'm sure there

I'm sure there were lots of cars, okay?
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But what happens when people are in shock?

2

thinking clearly?

3

not prepared for it, are you thinking clearly?

4

okay?

5

look for cars a~d people; but as she's fighting to keep him

6

off her, do you t~ink she's going tc see a car, she's able to

7

distinguish cars or distinguish people? It's probably extremely

8

difficult for her., okay?

9

where she's wrong.

When a si:~ation like that happens, you're
Probably not,

There's two thoughts in her mind which is keep driving,

So, yeah, that's probably one point

There probably were some cars out there,

10

here and there, but don't hold that against her, because she

11

was in shock, okay?

12

@

Are you

Let me -- let me talk a little bit about that.

Police

13

officers are a group of people tha: do a lot of training so

14

they can act correctly ~hen chey're 1n stressful situations

15

when things arc happeni~g that are unexpected, okay?

16

police officer will go cut to the shooting range and he doesn't

17

just get his weapon and start shooting and try to be accurate,

18

right?

19

shot at, okay?

20

and then take two steps, and shoot, and take two steps, right?

21

Because they're training their body to do that.

22

So like a

T~ey train for conditions where they're going to be
So, you know, they'll -- they' 11 be shooting

Why is that important?

Because if somebody's shooting

23

at you, you don't ~ant to be

24

you've got to move around.

25

situation, that's what they do, that they au~omatically react.

3

standing target,

right?

So

So ~hey train that way, but in that
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1

If you played sports,

2

know,

3

that same motion, that same motion over and over again,

4

you're in a game and it's a stressful situation,

5

to think about it.

6

knows what to do.

7

like basketball,

you practice over and over again,

you

they practice free throws, you know,
so when

you don't have

Your body already knows, and so already

There's a really interesting story about training,

8

it's also about police officers.

9

was a string 6f bank robberies across the country.

About 50 years ago there
The FBI

10

was involved, and on a couple of situations they -- they got

11

the robbers right at the bank, and there was a shootout.

12

After everything calmed down, there were some FBI

13

agents that were shot and killed, and they found them laying

14

on the ground with the copper bullet casings in their hand.

15

Everyone thought this was so strange at the time.

16

were shot did they fall on the ground and start picking them

17

up?

After they

I mean, what's going on?
@

18

Well, they went back and they looked at how these

19

officers trained.

When you shoot a gun, you know, the bullet

20

casing comes out.

It just flies out, and it pretty much just

21

falls on the ground.

22

you have to go and pick it up.

23

Because you're done with your training and then you have to go

24

out, and there could be hundreds of bullet casings that you've

Then afterwards,

if you're responsible,

That's really annoying,

right?

~ul L~ ~o pick ~p.
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1

So these off -- these fBI agents had got in the habit

2

of after they shot, t~ey could catch the bullet casings in

3

their hand, and they had trained that way.

4

the bank robbery and tha~ instinct kicked in,

5

situation, they =aught the bullet casings.

6

somebody was shooting at the~. they still caught the bullet

7

casings; and when they were shot and killed,

8

were still in their hands.

9

So when they got to
in that stressful

While they were

the bullet casings

Do you think Melissa Sorenson was trained to know what

10

to have to do when (inaudible), or do you think that her body

11

was in shock?

Her mind was stressed, and she probably did some

12

weird things.

You might think that why didn't she just park

13

that car and get out and run and yell and scream?

14

didn't she do that?

15

Yeah, why

I don't know.

She was really stressed out.

There's also a really

16

big guy in her car.

17

t-lhy -- why didn't she stop the first time instead of continuing

18

to drive?

19

out and she was shocked by being sexually assaulted.

He probably would have caught her anyway.

@

20

®

@

We don't know why.

We do know that she was stressed

I'm asking you to go in that room and really think

21

about the evidence, who to believe here today.

22

your deliberations I'm asking you to find the defendant Paul

23

Waldoch guilty of Count I, object rape; Count II, forcible

24

sex,Jal abuse; and Count III,

25

TH£

At the end of

forcible se:-:ual abuse.

Thank you.

COURT: Mr. Leigr..
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MR. LEIGH: Thank you,

your Honor.

Your Honor, Mr. Van

2

Dyke, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, thank you for your time

3

(inaudible).

4

sit there for eight hours each day and going through all this

5

and listening to all this evidence, we are grateful for you

6

serving on this jury this day.

7

Perhaps

(inaudible) situation is that {inaudible)

As you look at this case I want you to remember some

8

things.

9

the State

First is there's some -- there's various burdens that
well,

that there are in the legal field.

The

10

first one is reasonable suspicion.

11

when police officers just kind of s~spect something's going

12

on, and the police just kind of believes that.

13

It's way down here.

@

It's

Then a little bit higher is the probable cause

14

standard.

15

is happening.

16

little bit higher up here.

17

that's required and tha~•s in most civil actions and it's kind

18

of a balancing thing,

19

weighs the most.

20

civil cases and certain types of civil cases, and that's clear

21

and convincing evidence.

22

one side that outwelghs the other.

23

It's possible something has happened and probably
That's still a criminal standard.

It's just a

Then you've got a little bit higher

you know, which one weighs -- which one

Then you've got a little bit higher here in

It's (inaudible) a lot of emphasis on

Criminal cases the evidence has to be clear up here.

24

Has to be beyond a reasonable doubt.

2S

clear.

It has to be crystal clear.

:t

@

has to be crystal

Really what this amounts
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to is we want to protect the innocent from an injustice, and

2

prevent a miscarriage of justice.

3

{inaudible).

4

That's why it's such a

Mr. VanDyke mentioned (inaudible) not to spend a lot

5

of time I think on the definitions, but you need to spend some

6

time on this case,

7

you spend,

8

in this case.

9

big picture here.

10

including the definitions.

The more time

the more you realize that there is reasonable doubt
You really need to look at the big picture,

Let's go through some things.

the

Let's go through this

11

driving route that we have here.

12

Inn over here, proceeded on Highway 89.

13

driving the vehicle.

14

(inaudible).

15

turn on 89, that's what started to take place.

16

This is not way down 89, but this is right when she turned onto

17

there.

18

It started at the Victorian
Ms. Sorenson was

She started driving across from Victorian

She turned right onto 89.

She stated once you
Very early on.

She claimed that she was looking for any person to

19

find that she could contact, but she couldn't see anyone.

20

Mr. VanDyke,

21

probably people out there," but she said -- he said, wwell,

22

probably wasn't focused."

23

they' re focused

24

place where I could see people,n that he would be scared.

25

said,

he ultimately says,

"Well, we've got

Now,

there's

@
she

He went into police officers and how

(inacldible).

She says,

"If I found a public

"I was frantically trying to find a person to help.ff

She
She
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1

was looking for a way out, in her own words there.

2

She stated that she stopped several times along the

3

way, three times.

4

witness stand and reported several times.

5

in front of Houston's.

6

time 7 o'clock -- between 7 and 7:30.

7

7 o'clock in the morning.

8
9

That's what she put on the -- sat on the
She said she stopped

This was the morning of the 31~, someHouston's is open at

There's no evidence that he was grabbing her, holding
her, preventing her from leaving that car.

In fact, she stated

10

that she could have left, she could have ran away, she could

11

have ran to those places, but she didn't do that.

12

not to do that.

13

have gotten out of that situation.

14

Why didn't she get out of this situation?

15

find someplace to do that.

16

This was a consensual situation we had, and not a rape.

17

She could have left harm's way.

She chose

@

She could

You need to look at that.
She was trying to

Well, because she really wasn't.

She had numerous opportunities to pull into places

18

where -- and I went through those with her.

19

that this was between 7 and 7:30 on May 30t~.

20

tourist season.

21

these places and claimed she didn't see anyone at any of these

22

places.

23

Service station, Treasure T=ail Motel, Best Western Motel,

24

Aikin's Lodge, Shell Gas Station, Perry Ledge.

25

significance is she passed the po:ice station, the police

This was (inaudible}.

Day's Inn,

Keep in mind
This was the

She passed several of

(Inaudible), Four Seasons Motel, Sinclair

@

Of real
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station.

Where would we go for safety?

@

2

Now,

she would -- she had -- she claimed (inaudible)

3

she had such an awareness that she said, "Oh,

4

cars over there.

5

police s~ation,

6

is someone going to stick around and assault -- would they

7

stick around after you pull into a police station?

8

nor..

9

I didn't see nay

So I wasn't going to go there."

(Inaudible0

you go there. If you pull into a police station

She went by Samec,

Of course

right on the corner there.

She

10

could have easily pulled into Samec, open 24 hours a day.

11

could have pulled right there,

12

got out of harm's way.

13

pulled into Glazier's Market,

14

got away.

15

She

she could have run in there and

She could have been -- she could have

Did she do that?

Honey's Market, went in there and

No.

She could have pulled into any of these businesses and

16

attacked her attacker.

17

hit him,

18

didn't do that.

19

because this is a consensual

She could have bit him,

she could have

scratched him, any way to get out of harm's way.

She

@

20
@

All of these thi~gs she forgot to do.

That's

(inaudible).

(Inaudible) no DNA of my client found en the victim's

21

neck.

22

There was apparently unknown contributor on the neck as well.

23

Also,

24

found on the sweater,

25

likely that the two matched up.

It was her DNA, Melissa's Dl~A, but no DNA from rny client.

the DNA e½pert testified L~at 1n seminal swab that was
there was also an unknown DNA and it was
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1

Where did they come from?

Melissa, she didn't know

2

how it got on there; but. from the time of this alleged incident

3

until she went into the emergency room she didn't shower or

4

bathe.

5

or there would have been

6

sucking hard on her neck.

7

they took the swab, was to -- the nurse mentioned it.

8

the swab right where Melissa claimed he was sucking on the

9

neck, and that was the purpose of that.

10

If my client were to (inaudible), she would have
DNA

(inaudible).

She claimed he was

The purpose of the swab itself, when

There was the vaginal swab.

She took

No male DNA was detected

11

on the vaginal swab.

12

in her vagina rubbing vigorously.

13

rubbing vigorously when they were stopped.

14

contradicting testimony about en route to when they stopped,

15

as I recall it.

16

vigorously as they were moving, but then she contradicted that

17

and says, "Oh, no, he was just trying to insert his finger in

18

my vagina, but there was no rubbing.

19

started to take place.

20

She claims that my client had his finger
She claimed that he was
However, she had

She initially testified yeah, he was rubbing

The rubbing hadn't

Inconsistent testimonies.

My client doesn't deny that he ejaculated, but he

21

claims what happened was consensual sex.

22

mony.

23

from the time that party until the time they got to Zion's

24

Call Center, the facts bear out this was consensual activity.

25

Clearly if she wan~ed to get out of this situation, she cuuld

These facts bear it out.

That was his testi-

If you look at what happened

@
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1

have at any time.

2

the neck, and no bruises or abrasions found in her pubic area,

3

just on her labia, but she claimed he was vigorously inserting

4

himself down the front of her pants.

Hard to (i~audible).

The SANE nurse in the r~ports and the testimony,

5

6

there was never any complaint to them about anymore bruises

7

or lacerations.

8

lacerations were not (inaudible).

The expert testified that these bruises and

One (inaudible) is that Ms. Sorenson refused medication

9

®

There was no inJuries or abrasions found on

10

(inaudible) to deal with venereal diseases and those type of

11

diseases.

12

sticking his tongue in her mouth in and out, in and out several

13

times.

14

She was kissing -- he was kissing her,

(inaudible)

He had his finger in her vagina (inaudible).
Jf she claimed that she was beaten by him why did she

15

decline medications?

16

may have had.

17

would want medications.

18

something to take so you wouldn't get some type of disease,

19

AIDS or whatever it may be.

20

She didn't know what type of disease he

If you're being violated or been violated you
You may even beg for medications,

She admitted on the witness stand that (inaudible)

21

there was no per.etration.

22

emergency room PA's report -- and this was what was reported

23

from her, and chis was ·,1ord-fcr-wi:;rd from his report -- "She

24

believes that t.he assailant would have been more forceful and

25

penetration would have occurred if the patient was not on her

It's in her own words,

In the
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period at that time.h

2

Now, the PA got on the witness stand and he tried to

3

say, "Oh, that was her - or that was his penis that he was

4

talking about.•

5

penis.

6

would have been more forceful and that penetration would have

7

occurred if the patient was not on her period at that time.

8

Now, those were her words.

9

was always digital penetration.

10

No, there was never anything mentioned of

I;: was digital penetration.

She b~lieved the assailant

Never anything about penis.

It

She also stated in her words, that is written in the

11

report from the PA, that she hesitated in coming and reporting

12

the incident because there was no actual penetration.

13

was convinced by her friends that it was an assault that should

14

have been reported.

15

That she

Another significant thing is when she was talking to

16

the SANE nurse, the SANE nurse asked her to give a narrative

17

about what had happened.

18

at that point.

19

specific things did she mention, "Oh, yeah, penetration."

20

No mention of penetration was made

Only when the SANE nurse started asking her

I can relate that to the way that questioning are

21

done with children.

22

questions, "Well, what about this?

23

abou;: this?"

24

lead them.

25

or something to that effect.

With children, they don't have leading
What about this?

What

No, when they question children, they don't
They just ask,

'Tell me what. happened about that,"
"Te!l m~ what happened about
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that.u

2

happei:?

They dor:' t

3

get

ir:to :.he syec1£ics,

Jid this happen?

HlrJe~l,

Did th~s happen?

did this

Did this happen?

That's the s:tuation we have here with the SANE nurse

4

when she was asked what happened.

5

No.

6

mention of tha~ per1etra~~10;1

Did she me~t1on penetration?

The nurse mentioned from tha: witness stand there was no

7

(1.naud:ble).

Now to th&L !ao1~ ~nJuty.

8

the age o! Lhe abrasion was (inaudible)

9

possible ::.t ,:ould have bee:1

10

She .sai.rl,

two days old.

(1;,auc:2.hle)?

"The:3e ::.ype of

L:ke:y not

inJuries heal fast."

So is it.
:.we days
Appea:cs to

11

-- then she stated, "This appears to be a fresh inJury."

12

also gave other scenarios li~audible).

13

When she reported thin;s to the medical people she

J. 4

s2ij

15

took him home after the (1na~dibleO.

::. 6

{inc1Jdib:e).

17

these acts occurred when she's dr1v1ng hirn home.

18

could have gotten out

that she

19

in t~1e reports,

i:.he pulice repor.--:s,

say she

She took hirn home, ,,,hic:1

Joesr:' t

1r.,:1

ke ~en.se.

Again,

All of
she

{ir.audible).

Mr. Wa.ldosh's testimony was pretty consistent.

20
21

She

It' s

7hese were consensual
eels

( inaut.Eble).

22

She did noch1ng to get out cf harm's way.
f'.f't:cr

23
:2 4

25

?.':[cl!lS[

f,·;:~ u j,
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1

citizens for the jury systeG.

2

these two days that adds ~p to a ~ot gui!ty verd:ct,

3

the State hasn't proven its case.

4

Reasonable doubt has been shown
because

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. VanDyke.
MF.

'./ANDYJ<E:

Tl:=1n;,, you,

your ,{onor.

You kno1-1,

G

ir,

6

the 195G' s one of the ele1r,ents c,f rape 1-1asn' t

7

without consent of the victim, but the victim ~ad to show that

8

she had resisted by fo:ce.

9

That means if some guy ·,1alked up to a girl and said,

just. t.hat it vias

G

Okay, now what does that mean?
"Hey,

10

let's have sex,u and the girl says, "No,N and he made her do

11

it any~-.,ay,

12

resist him,

13

G

that.

it. 1.voulcin' t be a crime if she didr.' t

try to

Q

okay?

I..et' s not go back to that, okay?

"No" means no;

we'·Je

14

all r.eard that,

15

wants you to believe that because she didn': bite and scratch

16

and yell and screa~ and de a~l sorts of ether things, that it's

17

r.ot believah~e. \'Jell,

18

sexual assault victim is di!ferent in ~ow they :respond.

19

blame her for what happened to her.

If Mr.

right'?

Leigh wants to -- I think he

Q

2-et me tel.l you, r:·,er; rape 'Jictim, every

Q

20

Don't

Now, Mr. Leigh says his client doesn't deny :hat he

21

ejaculated.

22

he deny thct ·,1hen you've got this DNA eY.pert that says,

')J

- _,

his sp~rm is o~ her.

24

that it could have been."

2S

not going tc deny :hat.

Well, of course he doesn't deny that.

How could
"Yeah,

There's one in 7J0 qu1nt1llicn pe~ple
Yeah, !twas him.

Of course he's

His story lines up with eve:ryching
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1

that could

2

stuff that he couldn't deny, he wculd have probably if he

3

could have denied that, but the DNA evidence was conclusive

4

so his story had to match.

that he couldn't possibly deny; but all that

Of course he doesn't deny that.

@

5

@

6

the stain on the sweater may have come from skin, and that

7

it's from the neck swabbing that could be saliva and coc:d be

8

skin.

9

the same person,

10
@

Now, the unknown sample of DNA that's skin DNA from

The DNA expert so1ys, "Yeo1h, I can't tell you if Lhat' s
but it could be the same person.u

What's the most reasonable explanation for that?

It

11

was probably one of her kids.

12

and she's at home with her kids and they brush up against her.

13

Yeah, their skin's going to be all over her sweater, okay?

14

she's a good mom and she loves her kids,

15

be all over (inaudible), okay?

16

She has a sweater that she wears

their DNA is going to

We don't -- on her neck we don't know if that was

17

saliva or skin that came from the u~known person, okay?

18

could have been her saliva.

19

She cried a lot.

20

because she was crying.

21

probably came from her nwn face.

22

try and say that there is so~e other random person out there

23

~hat committed this assault.

24

25

If

It

She laid in bed for two days.

Maybe she had snot running down her face
Probably her own saliva.
We don't know.

The skin
So let's not

I: was the defendant right here.

Mr. Leigh wants to try ar.d point out differences
in stories, discrepancies here and there.

Let me tell you
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1

about something that happened to me.

When I was a freshman in

2

college, I went to the College of Eastern Utah, and my family

3

lived in Orem, and I'd often go home on the weekends to see

4

them.

5

One time I had to get back to college and my car

6

wasn't working, so I borrowed my brother's car, and I had

7

another friend with me, and you know, we were driving way coo

8

late at night, and we were driving through a really dangerous

9

canyon.

®

We came out around a corner and then there was a

10

straight-of-way, a long straight-of-way.

11

time of year, and there was a semi coming the other direction,

12

and my friend looks out and says, "There's people in the road.

13

I think there's people walking across the road."

14

@

I was driving way too fast.

It was at the wrong

We get closer and it's

15

hard to see because of the semi coming the other way.

16

of blinded me from what was in the road, and I passed the semi

17

and wham, a huge elk, right, the biggest elk I'd ever seen in

18

my life, and it comes and hits the front windshield and flips

19

over and I slammed on my brakes and the elk lands on top of my

20

hood.

21

in total shock, and I'm quiet for a minute, then I just scream.

It kind

®

22

At first it's just knocked out.

I'm sitting there, I'm

Then after a few minutes this elk comes to, and it

23

gets off of my car and it starts to stand but its back is

24

broken and it can't -- it can't walk too well.

25

another semi comes by and hits its head and kills it.

Eventually
I'm
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1

still just sitting in the car just shocked.

2

out and pulls the deer off the road and then we wait for

3

somebody to pick us up and take us home, right?

4

My friend gets

Now, when we got to Price, to the college, I had to

@

5

talk to a police officer and make a police report.

6

think l told him that same story that I just told you?

7

the police officer it was just facts, okay?

8

Probably didn't tell him I was speeding.

9

him just the facts.

10
@

Do you
To

I was driving.

You know, I told

Then after I met with the police officer I got back

11

to my dorm, and you know, it was freshman dorms, so you know,

12

it was like 2 or 3 in the morning, there was still tons of kids

13

out there.

14

me what happened.

15

They could tell that I was still upset.

They asked

So I went and told them the story.

Partway into the story they started to laugh because

16

of how I was telling it.

17

point it seemed like, oh, this funny thing, and my friend just

18

getting out of the car and pulling the deer off the road.

19

you think I told the story exactly the same as I did just now,

20

or the same way I told it to the police officer?

It just seem -- you know, at that

@

21

Does that mean it didn't happen?

Do

Does that mean I'm

22

lying to you right now, or did I actually hit that deer?

23

actually total my brother's car?

24

you think I told him a little bit different?

25

didn't happen?

Did I

When I told him the story do
Does that mean it

Does that mean that Melissa Sorenson wasn't
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0

1

sexually assaulted?

2

3

Let's talk a little bit about the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt,

okay?

talk about that standard.

!

Le:'s talk about it.

LeL rr,e

!:ve with that standard every day.

5

As a prosec~tor 1f I can't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

6

a crime occurred,

7

should pursue.

:t's not something I

I have -- I have to meet that standard, okay?

A lot of defense atLorneys like Mr.

8

9

it. doesn't matter.

Leigh want you

to think that that's kind ot an impossible standard for me tc

10

reach,

11

that standard.

12

a little tired this is my last story,

13

we often had big family parties ac ~ew Year's, and I had one

14

uncle who always did a jigsaw puzzle.

15

okay?

I

So let me -- let me kind of explain how I view
I was a kid growing up

and if you're getting
so just hang in :here --

G

didn't realJ.y care for doing them.

I

was too little

16

to (inaudible)

17

make a

18

to come and see him start and putting the edges oft.he puzzle

19

together and start to form a picture.

20

know,

21

something else,

22

piecP.s of t:h~: puzzle

these !ictle teeny tiny pieces,

5,000,

(inaudible), but. it ·,1as all-,ay::, interesting,

trying to

you know,

Then I would go,

play with some cousins, do sc11,e -- ,1at:ch a movie,
come back a little bit later,
VH) 1Jld

stc-:rt r(~ form,

you
do

(inaudible) more

okr:iy,

what's t.his

23

24
•,c,

LJ

I would leave, come back,

the!e's more puzzle pieces.

Then clt. ::;um<= point he's r~ot finished,

t.here' s noc ever.y single
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1

puzzle piece in there, but you can tell what the puzzle is,

2

right?

3

coast of California; you can tell

4

ever seeing a puzzle piece in there.

5

you know,

6

every single puzzle piece to know beyond a reasonable doubt

7

what that puzzle -- what that pic:~re

8

No,

you

9

You can tell tha: this is,

you know,

a sunset off the

(inaudible), right, without
You can tell that it was,

a cat playing with a ball (inaudible}.

.

?

15.

Do you need

Absolutely not.

(inaudible), right?
Now,

in this case there's lots of puzzle pieces.

10

There's DNA evidence,

11

the actual sweater you can see where the DNA sample's cut off

12

of the sweater.

Is that conclusive in and of itself that this

13

crime occurred?

No, but that's a puzzle piece.

14

his hat that was left in her car.

15

Probably not super important, but it's a little puzzle piece,

16

okay?

17

there's -- you know,

from her sweater,

We've got

Is that super important?

All of these little pieces of evidence, what you've

18

heard today, are all little puzzle pieces, all of the pictures

19

for. documentation from the SANE example.

20

story to several different people and was consistent in the

21

fact that she was sexually assaulted.

22

a lot of puzzle pieces.

23

That she told her

Those are -- that's

When you put those puzzle pieces together -- hopefully

24

I've helped you enough to put those puzzle pieces together,

25

but when you do,

you're not going ~o have every single puzzle
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1

piece because you weren't there.

2

because you weren't there; but you have enough puzzle pieces

3

today to find the defendant guilty of object rape and two

4

counts of forcible sexual abuse.

5

today.

6

You don't know what happened

That's what I ask you to do

Thank you.
THE

COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, we will

7

now excuse Mr. Franklin and Ms. Rasmussen.

8

bailiff to -- do you need to talk to him?

MR. LEIGH: Just making sure I did something on the

9

10

Can. I ask the

(inaudible) .

11

THE COURT: We're going to have the bailiff gather up

12

the exhibits and he'll bring to you in the jury room.

13

going to put the bailiff under oath to take -- keep track of

14

you.

15

®

I'm

I'll ask the clerk to do that now.
COURT CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that you will take

16

this jury to some convenient and private place to deliberate,

17

allowing no one to speak to them, nor to do so yourself unless

18

ordered, and to return them into Court when they have reached a

19

verdict or when ordered (inaudible)?

20

COURT CLERK: I do.

21

THE COURT: All right,

@

I do release you from the order

22

not to talk and instruct you to start talking to each other.

23

All right, Mr. Bailiff, will you take them.

24

25

MR. VANDYKE: Your Honor, there is a -- the DVD video

a,

':s:;I

is already ill Lhere.
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